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By Hans A. Linde* 
Due Process 
Of Lawmaking 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Edward S. Corwin wrote in the 1920s about the practice 
of American courts to review the substance of legislation, a topic 
which then occupied center stage in constitutional law, he prefaced 
one of his articles with this quotation from Mr. Justice Holmes: 
"Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as 
the architect is the most important man who takes part in the build-
ing of a house."1 I have seized upon this quotation in anticipatory 
self-defense, specifically defense against that much more famous 
quotation from Holmes that the life of the law has not been logic 
but experience;2 for we are returning, a half-century later, to the 
same topic-the revival of substantive judicial review of legislation 
-and what we shall discuss will have more to do with the role 
of logic in the life of the law than with experience. So I am glad 
that the famous judge and theorist to whom we are indebted for 
this occasion also provided a text on the importance of theory in 
the dogma of the law; f.or our purposes, in the dogmas 'Of consti-
tutional law. 
Holmes's celebrated observation about logic and experience 
opened a book on the common law, and the Constitution of the 
United States, I might point out, is not common law. But I do not 
want to beg the question. If by constitutional law 'One means the 
decisions of courts <>n judicial review of governmental acts, con-
stitutional law over long periods of time indeed looks very much 
like common law. It is natural that judge-made formulas, once 
pronounced, take on a life independent of their supposed sources 
in the Constitution, and ithat the application of these judicial for-
mulas should become the daily rule in constitutional litigation and 
their reexamination the exception. A generation of lawyers will 
cast their pleadings and arguments in terms <>f vested rights, or rthe 
* Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. B.A. 1947, Reed 
College; J.D. 1950, University of California, Berkeley. 
1. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutiona! 
Law, 42 HARv. L. REV. 149 (1928), quoting Holmes, The Path of the 
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897). 
2. "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." 
0.W. HOLMES, Tm: COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
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original package doctrine, or direct and indirect effects, or unrea-
sonable burdens, or clear and present danger, or overbreadth and 
chilling effects if these are the words that appear in Supreme Court 
opinions, and new opinions from the lowest to the highest courts 
will in turn respond in the same terms. Like common law, the 
accretion of constitutional case law will reflect cumulative experi-
ence, not the original logic, so much so that Justice Stone, in 1936, 
could celebrate the rubrics by which judges protect individual 
rights against government as part of the common law of the 
United States.3 
Still, the submerged constitutional premises, unlike common 
law, remain in place to be rediscovered. The 1920s, a period of 
much scholarship about judicial review under the state and federal 
due process clauses, proved also to mark the end of the judge-made 
formulations of due process that the scholars were analyzing, which 
were soon to be followed by a radical reconsideration of the under-
lying theory. By 1939, Robert H. Jackson, then Solicitor General 
of the United States, could look back on the bad old days when 
constitutional law had grown up "case by case, into a sort of super-
common-law" in which a lawyer devoted himself "to distinguishing 
and reconciling the language of judicial opinions, instead of ground-
ing himself in the language and historic meaning of the Constitu-
tion itself,'' and he could announce with satisfaction: "We are 
really back to the Constitution."4 That boast might be called naive 
if it came from someone other than Robert Jackson, or at least not 
unbiased, coming as it did from a New Deal Solicitor General 
addressing the AB.A. section on public utility law. Still, when the 
wholesale reversal of a half-century of Supreme Court case law 
can be hailed as a return to a fixed reference point beyond the case 
law itself, the reminder that somewhere at the bottom of constitu-
tional law "it is a Constitution we are expounding"5 becomes 
important beyond the realms of academic debate. It suggests a 
rather different balance between the demands of logic and experi-
ence in constitutional law than does, for instance, the celebrated 
judicial evolution of .the law of products liability in the law of tor.ts. 
It even suggests that the reference back from the cases to "the lan-
guage and historic meaning of the Constitution itself,'' which Jack-
son hailed, might from time to time serve future needs to reexamine 
3. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REV. 4, 
23 (1936). 
4. Jackson, Back to the Constitution, 25 A.B.A.J. 745 (1939). 
5. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
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the dogma of the law, in Holmes's phrase, as it served the genera-
tion of 1939. a 
What I want to discuss is a problem in the theory of Qne such 
dogma of constitutional law: the judicial formula that a law is 
invalid by virtue of the fifth or the fourteenth amendment unless 
it is a rational means toward some intended legislative end. The 
formula is well known to everyone who has studied constitutional 
law. The question of theory that it poses is this: What is due 
process of law in legislation, or, more briefly, what is due process 
of lawmaking? 
The question is not new. What makes it timely in 1975 is the 
return, after forty years, of active judicial appraisal of the sub-
stance of laws directly under section one of the fouriteenth amend-
ment and also, by a curious form of reverse incorporation, under 
the due process clause of the fifth, an appraisal for "reasonableness" 
which is unaided by substantive values attributed to other provi-
sions of the Constitution. The practice itself would seem thor-
oughly familiar to the lawyers and commentators of the 1920s, even 
if the clients who are most benefited by its revival fifty years later 
would not. Just as familiar would be the current formulations of 
standards for judicial review of legislative policies, after a brief 
refresher course to pick up the equal protection talk. If the devel-
opment would startle Solicitor General Jackson, he can put part of 
the blame on an opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Railway Express 
Agency v. New York.1 
Before turning to these judicial formulations, however, let me 
offer another word about theory. Although we begin with the 
formulas of Supreme Court cases, our concern is not with the cur-
rent state of the Court's case law. .Rather, I propose to look at 
the assumptions about constitutional lawmaking that are implicit 
in the judicial formulas in order to examine whether they repre-
sent a tenable constitutional theory. 
Constitutional theory, in this context, can refer to some very 
different questions, depending on whether one chooses to focus on 
the institution of judicial review or on the interpretation of the 
6. Justice Frankfurter, then in his first year on the Court, wrote about 
the tendency to "encrust" interpretations upon the Constitution and 
"thereafter to consider merely what has been judicially said." Graves 
v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491 (1939) (concurring 
opinion). · 
Judicial exegesis is unavoidable with reference to an organic 
act like our Constitution, drawn in many particulars with 
purposed vagueness so as to leave room for the unfolding 
future. But the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is 
the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it. 
Id. This insight, of course, will come easier to new judges when the 
"we" who said it is purely institutional rather than personal. 
7. 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (concurring opinion). 
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Constitution that judges offer in explanation of judicial review. In 
the classical view, the foundation on which Chief Justice Marshall 
built judicial review in Marbury v. Madison,8 courts can invalidate 
an act of the government only when it fails to heed a constraint 
expressed or implied in the Constitution. Theory, then, means the 
theory intrinsic to the judicial doctrines themselves, a theory of 
the Constitution as a charter by which government is to govern. 
Theory means, first, the premises that are offered in explanation 
of the doctrines, and second, the implications which these doctrines 
in turn have for the future conduct of courts and other institutions 
of government. 
Another view is more fashionable and no doubt more realistic. 
It finds the central fact of American constitutional law not in the 
Constitution as a political charter but rather in the institution of 
judicial review. Of course Marshall purported to derive judicial 
review from a duty to obey the constitutional text, but once the 
institution of review was established, the law of the Constitution 
inevitably became a consequence of the fact of review rather than 
vice versa. Since it has become the solemn task of American courts 
to assure that the country's laws and institutions remain responsive 
to its needs and its presumed ideals, the art of judging is to ac-
commodate these competing needs and ideals, to relate the con-
clusion to the phrases of the Constitution when possible, and not 
least importantly, to preserve the institution of judicial review 
itself. In this approach, theory concerns the proper relationship 
between court and government, the wise use of judicial power to 
strike the right balance between continuity and change, and a pre-
occupation with the logic of decision is more hindrance than help. 
A theory of decision may, indeed, be dispensed with altogether, as 
we saw in the abortion cases, and, it has recently been argued, so 
too may be the search for any peg in the text or structure of the 
Constitution as a premise for judicial action. 9 
The formula that laws are invalid unless they are rational means 
toward permissible legislative ends, however, has long been recited 
as a genuine standard of constitutional law. Without this formula 
some recent decision would have posed much more difficult and 
searching questions for the Supreme Court, and its revival by the 
Court poses very practical questions for advocates and lower courts 
throughout the country. Let us, therefore, pay it ihe respect of 
taking it seriously. I propose to examine the formula, first, as a 
premise for judicial review, and second, as a premise for the con-
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); 
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 
(1975). 
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stitutional conduct of government. Finally, we will ask whether 
due process can mean something else in lawmaking than a bar 
against oppressive or unreasonable laws. 
This will be an excursion into speculations about constitutional 
theory. If the excursion takes us rather far from what we know 
to be the actual judicial practice, you may judge at the end whether 
it was a quixotic undertaking, and I will rest on my quotations 
from Justice Holmes and Justice-to-be Jackson. 
II. "RATIONALITY" IN JUDICIAL.REVIEW 
Detour: The Equal Protection Clause. Let us recall briefly 
how we came to revert, in the 1970s, to this judge-made formula 
that laws be rational means to a legislative end. The notion had 
been, of course, axiomatic to judicial review of the so-called "police 
power" in what we used to refer to as a past "era rof substantive due 
process." On occasion ithe formula was recited as a test for 
equal protection, but this use was quite limited, because a law-
maker's policy would be sustained "if any state of facts reasonably 
could be conceived that would sustam it."10 We need not here 
retrace case by case how judicial review of the "rationality" of laws 
has reemerged from the equal protection clause. Briefly, the mod-
ern revival of equal protection doctrine initially consisted of finding 
new applications for the central principle of the clause: the protec-
tion of "discrete and insular minorities," identifiable by "immutable 
characteristics," against "discrimination" founded in "prejudice."11 
A law directed against members of such a minority ad hominem, 
classifying them by who they are rather than what they do, created 
an "invidious" or "suspect" classification and would be subjected 
to "strict scrutiny" to see if the classification was necessary to 
achieve a "compelling state interest." 
There is room for debate in the expansion of the list of suspect 
classifications from race, color, ethnic or national origin, through 
illegitimacy and alienage, to the current disagreement over classi-
flication by sex, just as there is room for debate about compelling 
state interests. But the important thing about this line of expan-
sion was that it kept the focus on the characteristics of ithe dis-
favored class, that is to say, on the classification ad hominem. For 
what is it that "suspect classifications" are suspected of? The 
suspicion, in that phrase, is suspicion of prejudice-not simply 
prejudgment based -on ignorance and mistaken notions of fact, but 
invidious prejudgment, grounded in notions of superiority and 
10. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). 
11. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
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inferiority, in beliefs about relative war.th, attitudes that deny 
the premise of human equality and that will n10t be readily sacri-
ficed to mere facts. The suspicion of prejudice focuses on the 
lawmaker's sense of values, not on his rationality. 
It was an innovation to extend strict scrutiny also when persons 
suffer discriminatory consequences for exercising guaranteed priv-
ileges, such as freedom of travel or speech or religion, but this too 
has solid constitutional ground outside any demand for reasonable-
ness. Equal protection classification applies here only because what 
the state has denied, such as welfare, or unemployment compensa-
tion, or public employment, or access to higher education, is not 
itself a constitutional entitlement; if it were, the equal protection 
claim of discrimination would be superfluous. A state need not 
maintain a welfare program, for instance, but if it does, it cannot 
deny welfare to short-time residents. Discrimination against recent 
arrivals is the invidious classification, not a forbidden deprivation 
of the right to travel, a premise that the Supreme Court promptly 
lost sight of after Shapiro v. Thompson.12 
. Finally, strict scrutiny was demanded when so-called fundamen-
tal interests were impaired by a trait ithat could not be called an 
invidious classification across the board, specifically, wealth or 
poverty. This extension seems to have stopped at certain rights 
of access to the political and legal process, when the Court declined 
to find education a fundamental right for lack of a constitutional 
source.13 An intrinsic weakness of fundamental rights terminol-
ogy is that it proves too much for mere equal protection: if a right 
is constitutionally fundamental, why may it be denied to everyone 
alike? 
This, in brief, summarizes the famous two-tier model of equal 
protection analysis. It deserves a better press than it has had in 
its later years. The two-tier model, as applied to policy making, 
offered a simple dichotomy: Government may not discriminate 
against persons on certain ad hominem grounds unless it can over-
come a strong suspicion of a prejudice that runs counter to the 
12. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
The confusion may have arisen in part because Connecticut actually 
argued that exclusion of indigents was a permissible purpose of dura-
tional residence requirements for welfare, and the Court held this 
a forbidden objective. But does Shapiro v. Thompson mean that a 
state must provide a welfare system if its absence would deter indi-
gent immigration, indeed if this is a reason why none has been 
enacted? If Shapiro meant that, it would not be an equal protection 
case striking down invidious discrimination in welfare aid. 394 U.S. 
at 627, 633, 638. 
13. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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equality postulated in the fourteenth amendment itself, nor may 
it discriminate on grounds made impermissible by other provisions 
of the Constitution; and it must be careful not to cause avoidable· 
social and economic distinctions in access to the political and legal 
processes themselves. In all other respects, the reach and limits 
of otherwise valid laws are assumed to have adequate explanations 
in whatever combination of policies caused them to take the shape 
they did. The strength of this simple model is not just that its 
premises are manageable in practice, though that is no small 
advantage. Its strength is that it calls for judicial scrutiny of a 
law only by reference to values located somewhere in the Constitu-
tion, values external to the complex of ends and means and mere 
inertia that has resulted in the existing state of the law. Two-
tier equal protection does not invite litigants and courts to test 
these products of action and inaction against the bare claim that 
the resulting balance among competing demands is intrinsically 
unreasonable. 
Yet the two-tier model has its price. Since it requires the 
reviewing court to accept or reject the demand to exercise strict 
scrutiny, it does not let the court use equal protection precisely 
to avoid committing itself on the underlying constitutional 
claim.14 It denies the court one tool of ad hoc case-by-case dis-
position that is always a preferred judicial option. And so by 1972 
Professor Gerald Gunther noted a substantial departure from two-
tier analysis and efforts by several Justices at new formulations 
under the equal protection clause. The efforts had not yet been 
very successful, in Gunther's view, but he welcomed the new inter-
ventionist direction of these efforts and thought that they might 
be made "justifiable, attractive and feasible."15 The means, he 
suggested, was to give new bite to the demand for minimum ration-
ality in lawmaking which in the two-tier approach was simply a 
phrase for judicial deference to legislators, the same deference 
accorded them under the due process clauses. Stated most simply, 
the "means-focused" model of review "would have the Court take 
seriously a constitutional requirement that has never been formally 
14. For example, a decision like Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 
92 (1972), using equal protection rather than the first amendment to 
strike down a law which prohibited picketing near schools but which 
excluded labor disputes, nevertheless needs the first amendment prem-
ise to challenge the classification. A different treatment of labor 
disputes and other disputes in most contexts easily withstands an 
equal protection challenge. 
15. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
19 (1972). 
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abandoned: that legislative means must substantially further legis-
lative ends," a principle which Gunther believes "survived the 
constitutional revolution of 1937."16 Since the yardstick for the 
rationality of the means would be the purposes chosen by the 
lawmakers, scrutiny of means would let the reviewing court 
avoid value judgments about legislative purposes or their relative 
weights.17 
The attractiveness of this approach to many reviewing courts 
has become increasingly evident since 1972. Our present interest 
is in its major premise. That premise is a thoroughly instrumen-
talist view of law. It not only assumes'that a law is always a means 
to an end, but it also asserts that law is constitutionally required 
to be a means to an end, and a rational means at that. If the 
premise is correct, it is hardly limited to the obligation of rational 
classification under the equal protection clause. Gunther himself 
sees classification as only a more specific formulation of a general 
principle inherent also in due process.18 Obviously, instrumental 
rationality was an axiom of the old substantive due process cases. 
Paul Brest also asserts that it survives as a modern standard of 
due process.19 Actually, it is not easy to find a modern Supreme 
Court holding that supports these assertions, because the Court for 
forty years has turned back every due process attack based on a 
mere lack of rationality. A few Justices have cared about the 
premise. Thus Justice Black, newly appointed in 1938, declined to 
join in that part of Justice Stone's famous Carolene Products 
opinion which left open a possible due process attack on the factual 
basis of a law, and when the Court twenty-five years later adopted 
16. Putting consistent new bite into the old equal protection 
would mean that the Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its imagination. It would 
have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative pur-
poses that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in 
conjecture. Moreover, it would have the Justices gauge the 
reasonableness of questionable means on the basis of mate-
rials that are offered to the Court, rather than resorting to 
rationalizations created by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing. 
Id. at 20-21. For later evidence of this "evolving doctrine," see, e.g., 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), another case under the 
fifth amendment. 
17. Id. at 21-22. 
18. Id. at 20. 
The distinction is not so much between equal protection and 
due process as between judicial scrutiny with regard to 
means and that directed at ends. . . . But due process, like 
equal protection, also purports to impose a requirement of 
a minimally rational means-end relationship. 
Id. at 23. 
19. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Uncon-
stitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 S. CT. REv. 95, 106. 
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Black's position with a conspicuous omission of rational relation 
talk, Justice Harlan in turn declined to j'<>in in that opinion.20 
Mostly the Court found it easier to recite hypothetical reasons for 
a law than to argue about the irrelevance of reasons.21 But a lower 
court misled by such opinions into discovering an insufficiently 
reasonable law would find itself reversed. 
Despite these doubts, it seems unlikely that a revived scrutiny 
of laws for rationality would long be limited to protection against 
unequal treatment. It is too fine a line to draw. With respect to 
federal law, equal protection is itself a recent and rather awkward 
application of the due process clause. The Supreme Court's latest 
holding that lawmakers deny due process when they act on "conclu-
sive presumptions" shows that several Justices are searching for 
another handle on substantive review than equal protection.22 
State courts, at least, would hardly doubt that review of the ration-
ality of laws meant a return to a view of due process that many 
of them have never ceased taking for granted. Although we might 
have backed into it from the equal protection clause, the doctrine, 
or as Holmes would say, the dogma, that law must be a rational 
means toward a legitimate end would soon be taken again to be 
a requirement of due process. 
But why not, one may ask? Would anyone argue that laws 
should not be rational means toward legitimate ends? Of course 
not. Put more precisely, would anyone defend the validity of a 
law that does not reasonably serve some purpose? That question 
is much harder. 
In practice, 'Of course, lawyers defending a challenged law will 
offer a court some pragmatic explanation. Here is a clear triumph 
of experience over logic. The mere existence of judicial review 
pushes cases into this form of ad hoc justification whether or not 
a constitutional premise requires iit. Usually it is easier for both 
counsel and court to deal with a rational-basis attack in its own 
terms than to debate whether a law .can be attacked on that ground 
20. 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
21. See North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Stores, Inc., 
414 U.S. 156 (1973); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, 
R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968) ; Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 
348 U.S. 483 (1955). Justice Douglas, for instance, who had re-
jected due process review on principle in Olsen v. Nebraska ex TeZ. 
W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), speculated on pos-
sible reasons for the laws sustained in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 
and returned in SnydeT's StDTes to the position that "opposed views 
of public policy are considerations for the legislative choice." 414 
U.S. at 167. 
22. Cleveland Bel. of Educ. v. LaFieur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
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at all. Holmes once said that there ought to be a better reason for 
a rule of law than that it was so laid down in the reign of Henry 
IV,23 but many lawyers and judges feel that there must be a better 
reason for a law than that it was enacted by more than one-half of 
those voting on the issue in a legislative body. The hesitancy any 
lawmaker, public official, or counsel would feel in denying a duty 
to defend the purpose of the usefulness 'Of a law sustains the prac-
tice more than any analysis. 
The sense of obligation to justify an exercise of power is essen-
tial in a democracy. But it does not prove that a law is unconsti-
tutional unless such a justification is made to a court or unless it 
could be made. The recent experiments of the Supreme Court 
with rational-basis formulas are moving the question of whether 
the formulas themselves have a rational basis back to center stage, 
where it was a half-century ago. And a new generation of critics 
is demonstrating that an affirmative answer is difficult indeed.24 
Let us turn to some of these difficulties in the dogmas of rational 
lawmaking. 
The Functions of Constitutional Norms. I must begin by stat-
ing more iully the point of theory that is central to what I have 
to say. It is that government must be shown to have failed in some 
respect to comply with the Constitution before a court can invali-
date a law. Except for sections dealing with courts and judicial 
procedures, constitutional directives for what to do and what not 
to do in making and administering law are addressed to govern-
ment in the first instance, and to judges only upon a claim that gov-
ernment has disregarded such a directive. On this Marshall founded 
the extraordinary judicial power to hold what lawmakers have 
enacted as a law to be not a law. Judicial review is the conse-
23. Holmes, supra note 1, at 469. 
24. I refer particularly to Professors John Hart Ely and Laurence H. 
Tribe of the Harvard Law School, and Paul Brest of Stanford. 
Many of the issues reviewed here are discussed also in Brest, 
supra note 19; BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
(1975); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Linde, Without "Due Process", 
49 ORE. L. REV. 125 (1970); Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideol-
ogy?, 2 PmL. & Pun. AJ!'F. 66 (1972); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 
10 HARV. CIV. Rmms-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 269 (1975); Tribe, Technology 
Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instru-
mental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973); Tribe, Ways Not 
to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental 
Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974); see also an excellent Note, Legis-
lative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 
(1972). The authors will recognize my debt to them, as I do, even 
if I do not re:pe<\t tb.ese citatiQns ~ th.e ar~Emt tlevelo:ps below, 
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quence of the constitutional rule, not the other way around. I am 
not speaking of literalism in interpreting the Constitution; the rule 
may be explicit or it may be implied from the constitutional text or 
fr-0m history or structure. Whatever the source of the rule, in 
theory a conscientious government must have been able to comply 
with it if a court is to hold. that it should haye compliedT or at 
least the government must be able to know how to comply in the 
future. The rule must make sense not only as a criterion for judi-
cial review but as a theory for the constitutional conduct of gov-
ernment antecedent ito judicial review. This is not a demand of 
prudence but of the logic of judicial review itself. Experience 
tell us the Constitution is what the judges say it is. But in logic, 
the judges themselves are bound to assert that the Constitution, 
however they interpret it, is a norm by which government could 
and should govern. 
The point sounds so obvioius that I am embarrassed to belabor 
it.25 I do so only to draw attention to two different questions 
we need to put to any Supreme Court formula, such as the formula 
that a law must be a rational means to a legislative end. One ques-
tion is whether the formula states a workable criterion to be ap-
.plied by reviewing courts. Since our constitutional law scholarship 
is preoccupied with judicial review, most of the critiques of the 
Supreme Court's formulas address that question. The other ques-
tion is the one I have just stated: Do the formulas make sense 
as a theory for the constitutional conduct of government? As we 
shall see, some of the difficulties with "rational-basis" review are 
intrinsic to the process of judicial review itself. Others lie in the 
assumptions that it would impose on the lawmaking process. 
"Means-Ends" Review. Let us examine the doctrine that a 
valid law must be a rational means to a legitimate end as a for-
25. There is, in fact, high authority for the opposite view. Justice Stone, 
in the course of lecturing on the common law analogy to constitu-
tional adjudication, once said that "the great constitutional guaran-
tees and immunities of personal liberty and of property ..• are but 
statements of standards to be applied by courts according to the 
circumstances and conditions which call for their application ..•• 
They do not prescribe formulas to which governmental action must 
conform." Stone, supra. note 3, at 23. I doubt that Stone meant lit-
erally that the first, fourth, fifth or fourteenth amendments were 
directed to judges rather than to government officials either as a 
matter of historical intent or of analysis, or that as a former Attorney 
General he would have advised executive officers to do what they 
thought necessary (for instance, to burglarize in the interests of na-
tional security) until a court applied one of those great constitutional 
guarantees to stop them. The quotation shows how by 1936 half a 
century of preoccupation with judicial review had reversed what was 
premise and what was consequence in constitutional law. 
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mula for judicial review. Remember that it cannot be a formula 
only for the Supreme Court <of the United States. What does the 
formula imply for the process of litigation in the hundreds of state 
and federal courts in which counsel seek to raise constitutional 
objections against state and local laws irksome to their clients? 
Forty years ago, Felix Cohen wrote of it: "Taken seriously this 
.conception makes of our courts lunacy commissions sitting in judg-
ment upon the mental capacity 'Of legislators and, occasionally, of 
judicial brethren."26 
The first problem in examining the formula is the identification 
of goals. Professor Gunther stressed that the reviewing court 
should concentrate on the rationality of the means without disturb-
ing the legislative choice of ends.27 Still, although it purports to 
leave policy choices to the political process, the test depends on 
holding the law to some objective other than the immediate effect 
of the law itself. Thus it forces litigants to debate the ostensible 
or assumed goal of a policy as much as the likelihood that the goal 
will be reached by means of the challenged law. And the effort 
to phrase this debate as a scrutiny of reasons rather than of values 
-of rationality rather than of legitimacy-leads court and counsel 
into a labyrinth of fictions. 
One of the criticisms levied against the formula is that a law, 
even at the time it is enacted, is rarely meant to achieve one goal 
at the sacrifice of all others. This is most obvious in the case of 
statutory exemptions. Suppose a regulation, in my state of Oregon, 
imposed a weight-per-axle limit on all trucks in the interest of 
highway maintenance and safety, but allowed a higher limit for 
log trucks. The exemption would obviously be adopted not because 
log trucks are less of a danger to the highways, but because the 
state chose to protect the highways only to the extent consistent 
with another policy, not ito hamper an important industry. By 
the same token a pollution law might exempt steel mills, or a bond-
ing requirement might exempt trucks carrying agricultural goods. 
Certainly such exemptions are very rational means toward their 
ends, as the industries benefited by them will have argued strenu-
ously and successfully to the respective legislative committees. To 
invalidate one of them, as was done in the 1931 decision in Smith 
v. Cahoon,28 means to deny the legitimacy of the government's 
policy choice, not its rationality. 
26. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 808, 819 (1935). 
27. Gunther, supra note 15, at 23. 
28. 283 U.S. 553 (1931). 
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The principle is the same when a litigant protests that a burden 
has been placed on him for the benefit of another as when he pro-
tests an exemption granted to another. Suppose a legislature is 
persuaded, over the protests of opticians, that only ophthalmolo-
gists and optometrists should be permitted to adjust eye glass 
frames, and an optician attacks this regulation under the fourteenfh 
amendment. Or suppose another legislature is persuaded by dairy-
men to prohibit the sale of a milk substitute in which butterfat 
has been replaced by vegetable oil. How does judicial review tackle 
the issue of whether these laws are rational means toward per-
mitted ends? If you have recognized Williamson v. Lee Opitcal 
Co.29 and United States v. Carolene Products Co.3o in these 
examples, you will know that the Supreme Court in each case sus-
tained the regulation by finding that legislators could rationally 
believe that the measure would protect a consumer interest. But 
why must it be a consumer interest? The answer, of course, is 
that it need not be; this is only an easier way to sustain the law. 
What if all the evidence showed beyond dispute that opticians are 
excellent at fitting eye glasses and that vegetable oils are at least 
as healthy as butterfat, and government counsel had enough sense 
to defend the regulations as efforts to protect the economic security 
of optometrists or dairymen? Since the laws are likely to make 
some contribution toward that goal, they cannot be called ir-
rational. Instead, the litigants and the reviewing court are driven 
to search for a constitutional issue in the legislature's aims rather 
than its method-the very issue that means-centered review is 
intended to avoid. 
In these examples we still try to identify a pragmatic goal of 
legislation, protecting highways here, helping farmers there, trading 
off one interest for another largely with an eye on economic or 
social consequences. But why assume that laws are shaped only 
by pragmatic purposes? Men and women elected to lawmaking 
positions do not check their unspoken social assumptions, their 
human sympathies for various claims of equity or propriety, at the 
doors of the legislative chambers. You may recall the case in which 
the Railway Express Agency ("REA") attacked a New York City 
regulation that banned the use of trucks to display general com-
mercial advertising but exempted signs publicizing the business of 
the owner of the vehicle. The company argued that the distinction 
was not justified by the purpose of the regulation, that one of 
REA's trucks carrying an advertisement for Macy's would cause 
no greater distraction for other drivers or pedestrians than one of 
29. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
30. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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Macy's own trucks.31 Justice Jackson took the occasion in the sep-
arate opinion noted earlier to state the view of equal protection-
scrutiny of differential treatment for its relevance to the legislative 
.purpose-that is the foundation of Gunther's "Model for a Newer 
Equal Protection."32 In the majority ·opinion, Justice Douglas dis-
posed of REA's claim in a sentence: "The local authorities may 
well have concluded that those who advertise their own wares on 
their trucks do not present the same itraffic problem in view of the 
nature or extent of the advertising which they use."33 That is not 
judicial review but dismissal of a claim of review. But why should 
a court ask whether the lawmakers {!Oncluded any such thing? 
After all, if Railway Express switched from dull, conservative 
posters for Camel cigarettes to lurid, psychedelic signs heralding 
its own services, New York nevertheless would let its 1,900 
mobile billboards roam the streets at will. Suppose instead that 
the lawmakers never doubted that all itravelling signs were equally 
undesirable but felt that a business had a more equitable claim to 
identify itself on its trucks than to take up the advertising business 
as a sideline. Such a sense of the equities may be shared 'Or op-
posed, but its constitutional validity does not depend on arguments 
about traffic safety. 
Along the same lines, veterans' preference in public employment 
is better explained as direct appreciation or sympathy than as a 
calculated means toward some pragmatic goal, such as future 
recruitment, and the same can be said about tax or other advan-
tages unrelated to financial need for widows or disabled persons. 34 
31. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
32. Gunther, supra note 15. 
33. 336 U.S. at 110. 
34. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Fredrick v. United States, 
507 F.2d 1264 (Ct. Cl. 1974). In this view, the grant of property tax 
exemption for widows but not for widowers would be sustained, not 
because it was "reasonably designed to further the state policy of 
cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss," 416 U.S. at 355, but 
because it was not an "invidious" expression of prejudice in the sense 
stated above. See p. 201-02 in the text. By the same test, a city ordi-
nance disqualifying from employment veterans with less-than-honor-
able discharges, but not civilians with records of improper or crim-
inal conduct, might well prove to be an expression of simple prej-
udice about short-comings in performing a patriotic duty. See 
Thompson v. Gallagher, 389 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973) (another example 
in which a court expressly employed "rationality" as a test of due 
process as well as equal protection). The fourteenth amendment, tex-
tually and in the context of 1868, speaks to the hostile denial of equal 
protection to disfavored persons or groups, rather than to expressions 
of special sympathy. Contrast the earlier clauses typical in the 
states with post-revolutionary constitutions, prohibiting laws grant-
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The point appears also in contemporary attacks on the automo-
bile guest statutes for denying equal protection of the laws. In 
the decision that set off the current round of cases, the California 
Supreme Court rejected three possible reasons for denying· guests 
in automobiles tort recoveries that are available to other guests and 
to business passengers; to encourage hospitality, to prevent collu-
sive law suits, or to avoid rewarding ingratitude.35 Note that these 
hypothetical reasons are not of the same order. Only the first two 
assume pragmatic objectives; the third, the notion of ingratitude, 
would express a sense of the fitness of things, not an instrumental 
aim. The Oregon Supreme Court declined to follow the California 
court. It held that the guest statute interpreted the moral sense 
of the community with respect to hospitality and ingratitude, and 
that it was the legislature's role to discern such community 
values.36 The Iowa Supreme Court sustained that state's guest 
statute by reciting the policy justifications accepted by other courts, 
without making an independent examination of their validity in 
Iowa. But the heart of the matter was stated by Justice LeGrand 
in his concurring opinion: 
Like many other courts, we have said our guest statute was 
enacted to avoid collusive claims and to prevent an ungrateful 
guest from suing his host. It should be noted that those are rea-
sons the court has ascribed to the legislature. The legislature itself 
simply stated it enacted the guest statute to limit the liability of 
owners and drivers of motor vehicles . . . • It did not elaborate 
on why it did so. 
Perhaps the reasons for limiting this liability are those we have 
attributed to them. But this is. not necessarily the case. In any 
event it is important to remember these widely heralded motives 
were judicially conceived. They have never been legislatively 
expressed. 37 
Finally, in the same volume of reported cases, the Supreme Court 
of North Dakota very commendably tested the guest statute under 
the North Dakota as well as the Federal Constitution. The strik-
ing thing is that the court found the statute to be "unreasonable 
for any proper purpose of legislation . . . not based upon justifiable 
distinctions . . . arbitrary and overinclusive," and then held that 
ing "special privileges or immunities," as in Virginia's declaration 
that "no man or set of men is entitled to exclusive or separate emolu-
ments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of 
public services." VA. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (emphasis added); <:f. N.C. 
CONST. art. 1, § 3. 
35. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973). 
36. Duerst v. Limbocker, - Ore. -, 525 P.2d 99, 102-03 (1974). 
37. Keasling v. Thompson, - Ia.-, 217 N.W.2d 687, 693 (1974) (apecial 
concurring opinion). 
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it passed muster under the fourteenth amendment but fell afoul 
of the state constitution.as 
I pose this question: Suppose fourteenth amendment attacks on 
identical guest statutes had reached the United States Supreme 
Court from these four states. Taking the "means-ends" formula 
seriously, should the Court sustain them all, invalidate them all, 
or sustain some and invalidate the others? 
The outcome of an attack on the rationality of a law clearly 
can be made to depend on whether the law is described as a means 
toward a somewhat remote end or as very close to an end in itself. 
The criticisms I have sketched so far suggest that the search for 
a goal beyond the enacted policy itself will be illusory because a 
policy often results from the accommodation of competing and 
mutually inconsistent values, or because it simply intends to favor 
one interest at the expense of another, or because it represents only 
a judgment of the justice or equities in the immediate issue without 
intending to accomplish any further aim. Very well; but should it 
not be possible to measure the rationality of a policy against its 
actual goals, whatever they are? 
Certainly a court can sometimes search legislative history for 
the evolution of a policy, the stated aims of its proponents, the argu-
ments presented to their colleagues, and the competing policies that 
had to be accommodated to enact any law on the subject at all. 
But in the end, the constitutional question will be whether the aim 
of the law is out of bounds, not whether it will miss its target-
a question of legitimacy, not of rationality. It is a realistic postu-
late that laws do not get enacted for no reason at all, not in the 
American legislative process, but they may be and often are enacted 
for improper reasons. Thus in 1964, Congress had defined a house-
hold eligible for food stamps as a group of related or unrelated 
individuals living as an economic unit, purchasing and cooking their 
food together. In 1971, Congress amended the definition of house-
holds to disqualify unrelated persons under the age of 60. The 
Supreme Court first found that the distinction between households 
of related persons and those including an unrelated person was 
irrelevant to the original purposes Congress had declared in the 
1964 Food Stamp Act, which were to promote health and well-being 
by better nutrition among low-income households and to strengthen 
the agricultural econ10my.39 Accordingly, the 1971 amendment 
38. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 780 (N.D. 1974). Commendable 
as it was in method (whether or not in result), the court's independent 
reliance on the state constitution should have kept it from reaching 
any question under the fourteenth amendment. See Linde, supra note 
24. 
39. United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 
(1973). 
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was rtested by its own goals, not those of the· act as a whole. Per-
haps food stamps might reasonably have been limited to households 
of related persons because Congress wished to subsidize only con-
ventional families or to limit the opportunities for abuse of the food 
stamp program. That would not be irrational, as Justice Rehnquist 
said in dissent. But the legislative record showed that the 1971 
amendment was aimed at disqualifying so-called "hippy com-
munes," and the Court was prepared to declare this an impermis-
sible aim to harm a politically unpopular group.4o 
Earlier, when Congress withdrew Social Security benefits from 
persons deported as former Communists, though not from all de-
·portees, the Court had speculated that this might be a partial con-
tribution to the balance of payments and did not see either an 
irrational classification for that hypothetical purpose or an aim to 
harm political outcasts.41 Thus, the degree to which legislative 
purpose is scrutinized is easily manipulated even where legislative 
history exists. It is wide open when none exists. And, of course, 
legislative history of rthe kind we use fur federal statutes, including 
not only published committee reports but recorded testimony and 
floor debate, is rarely available in state and local lawmaking. 
The Role of Counsel. You will recognize that judicial review of 
laws as rational means to some end gives great importance to the 
role of counsel. Once a law is challenged on this ·ground, rthe re-
viewing court will expect the party defending the law to offer one 
or more purposes that the law might reasonably be thought to 
serve. Is it not curious :that the fate of an act of the legislature 
should hang on the capacity and willingness of the government's 
lawyer, and sometimes of a private party, to phrase the law's ob-
jectives so that neither rthey nor the chosen means are vulnerable 
to constitutional attack?42 What is counsel's obligation under the 
formula? Is it to defend the values that effectively moved the 
lawmaker rto act when he did, however shortsighted or parochial 
they may be? Or is it to show that the law might serve some 
present social purpose, either drawn from the rhetoric of legisla-
tive declarations or postulated for the first time to ithe court? 
The almost invariable impulse is to credit the lawmaker with 
aiming at some higher social goal, no matter how erratic this makes 
his course toward it appear. Indeed, a candid refusal to do so may 
backfire in state courts that assume the role of guardians of proper 
legislative purposes, with or without help from a constitution. In 
one unfortunate case a few years ago, counsel for some small truck-
40. Id. at 534-35. 
41. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). 
42. Cf. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process 
of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 n.28 (1973). 
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rental firms explained to the Oregon Supreme Court that his clients 
had succeeded in placing their business under public utility regula-
tion in order to protect themselves against competition from large 
national chains. The court treated this statement as a confession; 
it struck down the law on the ground that "[t]he desire of some 
members of a given industry, business or profession to achieve a 
'little monopoly' could not be made more palatable by asserting it 
is in the 'public interest,' even though the legislature might pe 
induced to say so."43 The decision was quite wrong, in my view, 
but what it rejected was clearly the low and simple aims of the 
law rather than its rationality as a means to !i.rts end. 
Sometimes it will be harder for a court to set aside a non-
instrumentalist value underlying a law than to find that the law 
does not further the practical goal invented for it. But it takes 
an advocate of unusual confidence to perceive this possibility and 
to rely on it in defending the law. Consider the recent decisions 
invalidating compulsory maternity leave for school teachers. The 
Supreme Court noted with evident relief that the school boards 
disclaimed reliance on an "outmoded taboo" against having school 
children taught by conspicuously pregnant teachers, which ap-
peared to have been the original motive for the rule. 44 Since coun-
sel instead offered such "after-the-fact rationalizations," in Justice 
Powell's phrase,45 as protecting the health of the teacher's unborn 
child and the administrative convenience of scheduling, the Court 
could happily proceed to find mandatory leave a needlessy imprecise 
means to those ends.46 Counsel's defense of the rule might well 
have been more challenging, and it could not have been less success-
ful, if it made the Court face the question of why an aim to delay 
the younger children's curiosity about pregnancy, or simply to 
accommodate the outmoded squeamishness of some regrettablY: old-
fashioned parents, is not merely foolish but forbidden by the 
Constitution. 
Of course, the court can refuse counsel's explanation of the legis-
lative purpose as readily as it can substitute his defense for the 
original policy. Shortly after the maternity leave cases, the 
Supreme Court had before it the conviction of a Seattle college 
student for displaying a peace symbol super-imposed on a United 
43. Hertz Corp. v. Heltzel, 217 Ore. 201>, 218, 341 P.2d 1063, 1069 (1959). 
See also Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Siggins, 359 Penn. 25, 58 
A.2d 464 (1948). 
44. 414 U.S. at 641 n.9. 
45. Id. at 653 (concurring opinion). 
46. Id. at 640-48. 
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States flag flown upside down, in violation of a state law. The 
per curiam opinion complained of being met "with something of 
an enigma in the manner in which the case was presented."4 7 The 
state supreme court had found no threatened breach of the peace 
but had affirmed the conviction on the basis of a national and state 
interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of the nation. The state's 
counsel, on the other hand, conceded that the state had no legiti-
mate interest in promoting respect for a symbol; in his view the 
only tenable basis for Washington's law was the breach-of-the-peace 
theory which the state court had rejected. In the end, the Supreme 
Court reviewed the defense offered by Washington's judges rather 
than by the state's advocate; it then concluded that the law had 
been 1.mconstitutionally applied in the appellant's case.48 
In sum, identification of the goals of a law offers wide choice 
between the past assumptions of a policy and its present justifica-
.tions, between actual and merely hypothetical goals, between imme-
diate objectives and larger social aims, between a series of separate 
goals or a single accommodation of competing interests, and be-
tween the statements of legislators, executive officers, or state 
courts. A formula for testing the constitutionality of a law as a 
rational means to an end needs to specify how to identify the rele-
vent legislative purpose among these different choices. But there 
is a reason why the judicial formulations have not done this. 
Lawmaking and Change. The reason, I think, lies in the basic 
ambivalence of this kind of review toward its underlying theory: 
whether it pur.ports only to keep lawmakers within constitutional 
bounds of responsibility, or whether it means to maintain continu-
ing judicial surveillance over the substance of laws. For a main 
difficulty with reviewing laws for rationality is the problem of 
time; that is, the time at which the law must be a rational means 
to an end in order to be constitutional. A somewhat similar diffi-
culty is the problem 'Of place, rthat is to say, whether a law can 
be found rational or irrational beyond the conditions in the area 
where it is enacted and where it is being tested. The dilemma is 
plain enough. Rationality, as a test, purports to address itself to 
that part of the lawmaking hypothesis that deals with prediction, 
with causes and effects in the world of physical and social reality. 
And this always means the reality of some time and place. But 
laws are made at one time and challenged at another. The prob-
lem of time is whether a law is ito be judged for its rationality 
when it was enacted or at the time when it is -challenged. 
47. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974). 
48. Id. at 414. 
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I quoted earlier the Supreme Court's formulation in 1911 that 
a law would not be found unconstitutional "if any state of facts 
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it."49 The re-
mainder of that sentence reads: " ... the existence of that state 
of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed."50 
This inirtial formulation focused on responsible lawmaking: an act 
of the legislature is rational or not in relation to the situation 
facing the legislature at the time of enactment. Suppose the law 
were challenged at once as an irrational means to its supposed end; 
then the goal of the legislative policy would be determined as of 
the time of enactment. If the law passed muster, its constitution-
ality would be taken to be established. But if rationality of law-
making is the test, no different resulrt should follow merely because 
the challenge happens to come at a later time. One can speak 
of legislative objectives and a rational choice of means only with 
respect to a legislative decision rthat succeeds in producing a law. 
Before and after enactment, there are always unachieved ends that 
lack agreement on suitable means, as well as disputes over the 
value of existing laws that must await agreement on amendments or 
repeal; moreover, the identities of the lawmakers vary constantly. 
Their changing reasons for not making a law are hardly the stuff 
for judicial review.51 
If responsible lawmaking is the premise of review, the purpose 
against which the rationality of the means is tested must obviously 
be the purpose intended at the time of enactment. It would make 
49. 220 U.S. at 78. 
50. Id. (emphasis added). 
51. The validity of a law is not usually considered to be impaired by the 
fact that it represents only a momentary diagnosis and prescription 
by a short-lived legislative majority that may at once have been 
repudiated on the very issue. As Merton Bernstein has pointed out: 
We take for granted that statutes once enacted continue in 
force until a later legislature takes affirmative action by a 
fresh majority to repeal or amend. Few statutes other than 
appropriation measures are enacted for limited periods; prac-
tically none expires with the legislature that enacted it de-
spite the sometimes tenuous majority that enacted it. Al-
though that majority no longer commands voter support, its 
law continues in force until a new coalition can be mustered 
to enact a new statut~a formidable task because not only 
must the old statute be repealed but a successor must be 
fashioned in a very complex process of accommodation. . • . 
The only Republican Congress in a period of twenty years 
enacted the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. A Democratic resur-
gence featured by the success of candidates prominently 
pledged to that statute's repeal failed to achieve the an-
nounced goal. 
Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 574 n.10 (1970). 
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little sense to accuse past legislators of irrationality because the 
facts on which they acted have subsequently changed. If a legis-
lature acted rationally when it decided to limit the adjustment 
of eye glasses to optometrists or to forbid trucks from carrying com-
mercial advertising, its decision is not retroactively made irrational 
by thereafter adding new training courses in opticians' schools or 
by showing that traffic on New York streets has come to a perma-
nent standstill and cannot possibly be distracted by mobile signs. 
It would make just as little sense to sustain a law because it turns 
out to serve some useful purpose different from the one for which 
it was originally enacted. When a rule requires teachers to take 
maternity leave in order to keep pregnancy out of classrooms, the 
rule is a rational means to its original end. If on subsequent judi-
cial review the end itself is regarded as an outmoded taboo, the 
rule cannot be defended as a rational response to a different prob-
lem that never occurred to the lawmaker. Legitimate ends and 
rational means must coincide at the time of the legislative decision, 
if responsible lawmaking is the constitutional premise. 
But that is logic. Experience tells us that this premise is too 
stringent for the daily practice of judicial review. In practice, court 
and counsel want to debate whether the law is constitutional now, 
not when it was enacted. The institutional thrust of judicial review 
is to maintain continuing surveillance over the substance of laws, 
not over lawmakers. If one formula of this surveillance is that 
laws must serve some legitimate social purpose, parties will be 
expected to litigate what purpose the law serves on the state of 
facts as they exist today, not on the state of facts at the time 
the law was enacted, as the Supreme Court prescribed in 1911. 52 
Thus, the Court has also said-in that part of Justice Stone's Caro-
lene Products -opinion in which Justice Black would not join-that 
the continued validity of a law may be challenged upon a change of 
factual circumstances when the law was predicated upon a particu-
lar state of facts. 53 Indeed, this emboldened a lower federal 
court in 1972 to hold that the same filled milk act twice sustained 
by the Supreme Court now deprives the successor of the Carolene 
52. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 22(} U.S. 61 (1911). 
53. 304 U.S. at 153, citing Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 
(1924). 
In Chastleton, it was assumed that rent control in the District of 
Columbia would be invalid except for the existence of a wartime 
emergency; in fact the Government felt obliged to rest rent control 
on the "war power" rather than on Congressional power to govern 
the District. The Court held that the continued existence of such an 
emergency, once declared in the statute, could be challenged on the 
basis of a contrary allegation and evidence introduced in court. 
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Products Co. of property without due process of law. 54 I doubt 
whether this holding would have been affirmed by the Supreme 
Court either in 1944 or in 1972. 55 Still, if the district court's deci-
sion was wrong because it second-guessed the instrumental ration-
ality of a 1923 statute by the nutritional standards of 1972, it would 
have been just as wrong if the filled milk act had never before 
been sustained. On the other hand, if the reasonableness of a law 
on present facts is subject to continuing review regardless of its 
original rationality, then no decision ever settles that a law is con-
stitutional on this score. To the extent that the 1944 Carolene 
Products opinion56 rested on the possibility that consumers might 
confuse filled milk with natural milk, the validity of the filled milk 
act could be relitigated the next day upon a showing that the pro-
ducer had completely redesigned its labels to avoid all risk of con-
fusion. But this approach to constitutional law is also unsatisfac-
tory in practice. The Congress is not the Federal Trade Com-
mission. 
The everyday choice between the two theories of review and 
their implications is shown by a very routine case at the level where 
the constitutional dogmas of the Supreme Court are translated into 
practice. The city of Burns, a small town in eastern Oregon, had 
adopted an ordinance in 1949 limiting the underground storage 
tanks of gasoline stations to a maximum capacity of 3,000 gallons 
each or 4,000 gallons at any one location. In 1966, a dealer who 
wished to truck his own gasoline from Portland and by-pass the 
local bulk storage plants, installed a 10,000 gallon tank and sued 
to have the ordinance declared unconstitutional. The court con-
ducted a lengthy trial at which expert witnesses testified about the 
relationship between the size of underground gasoline tanks and 
the risk of accidental fire, and about the topography, sewer system, 
traffic patterns, and firefighting capabilities of the city of Burns. 
On this evidence, the court held the ordinance void for lack of any 
reasonable basis in promoting safety, and the Oregon Supreme Court 
affirmed.57 No one stopped to question the original validity of 
the ordinance under the conditions of 1949; only the conditions at 
rfue date of trial were considered. I do not know whether this 
case represents judicial review for rationality as the proponents 
54. Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350· F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972). Cf. 
Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944); Sage 
Stores Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Mitchell, 323 U.S. 32 (1944). In the two 
1944 decisions finding that Congress and Kansas respectively had a 
"rational" basis to prohibit filled milk, Justice Douglas joined Black 
in concurring only in the result. 
55. Id. 
56. See note 54 supra. 
57. Leathers v. City of Burns, 251 Ore. 206, 444 P.2d 1010 (1968). 
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of such review visualize it, although I am not sure why not if one 
assumes that due process calls for such review at all. However, 
my immediate point is that on its own terms the whole elaborate 
litigaition has no value as a precedent 'On the constitutionality of 
laws limiting service tanks to 3,000 gallons or any other size. It 
could be a precedent at most for how to review such a law, i:f it 
were correct on that issue. The ordinance, which was unreason-
able on the evidence concerning Burns, Oregon, might be -consti-
tutional in Baker, Oregon. It might even be constitutional in 
Burns by 1975, if there has been significant change in gasoline 
-octane ratings or in traffic patterns -or in some other fact bearing 
on the risk of leaks and accidents and explosions. 
Of course, lawyers and judges are too wedded to precedent to 
confine my Oregon case in that fashion. 58 If a lawyer has a client 
who wishes to install a 10,000 gallon gasoline tank contrary to a 
city ordinance, he will be delighted and the city attorney will be 
chagrined to find that the Oregon Supreme Court has already held 
10,000 gallon tanks safe and ordinances forbidding them unreason-
able, although that was several years ago, and maybe his city 
council had some different objective in mind than the risk of fires. 
If the decision were made by the United States Supreme Court, 
one would be fairly certain that in practice, if not in theory, it 
knocked out such ordinances throughout the country. Yet review 
of rationality, since it refers to the lawmaker's prediction about the 
effects of his law, is tied to facts bearing on those effects in space 
and time, as distinguished from the values that he means to pro-
mote. A decision may find that a legislative goal is forbidden by 
the Constitution as far as the Constitution reaches. But a decision 
that lawmakers in a particular locale have pursued their goal by 
irrational means is precedent only as far as the goals and the facts 
remain the same. 
This adds to the logical difficulty of the time of instrumenital 
rationality the second paradox of place. Suppose the regulation 
challenged by the gasoline dealer in Burns had been a state law 
rather than a city ordinance. Would the constitutionality of such 
a state statute hinge on evidence about the topography and risks of 
fire in Burns? W'Ould it depend on whether a case from Burns 
reached the court before one from downtown Portland? I should 
think not. If the state law were rational because of the risks of 
large gasoline storage tanks in Portland, could it be enforced in 
58. See In re Martin 88 Nev. 666, 504 P.2d 14 (1972), which decided 
against the validity of a limit on gasoline tank trucks by choosing 
between the "majority view" and the "minority view" of the other 
courts on the constitutionality of such ordinances. 
220 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 2 (1976) 
Burns? Indeed, could the state adopt such a statewide law today, 
after the court's decision, and apply it in Burns? Why not, if the 
legislature had grounds for apprehension about large storage tanks 
in some locations in the state. In fact, if ithe same regulation were 
enacted by the Congress, it would presumably be enforceable 
throughout the country, as long as it might reasonably serve its 
supposed purpose under some circumstances. This is how we 
generally apply laws, without allowing a defense that they are 
not rationally needed in the particular instance. 
But the effect is surprising. It is to make the client's attack 
on a law-his claim that the legislative policy deprives him of prop-
erty without due process of law-depend neither on its goals nor 
on the facts, but rather on the level of government that made the 
policy: whether it was made by his own community, or in the more 
distant state capital, or in far-away Washington, D.C. For instance, 
the Supreme Court of Colorado could conclude in 1971 that there 
was no possible risk of deception or confusion that would justify 
prohibiting the sale of filled milk in Colorado, as the Nebraska 
Supreme Court and a number of others had concluded thirty-five 
years earlier in their respective states.59 Each held its own statute 
unconstitutional for lack of a rational basis. Despite this, the fed-
eral filled milk act would continue to prohibit the sale of the identi-
cal products between Nebraska and Colorado. Is that because Con-
gress could assess the relevant facts more rationally than the two 
local governments? This effect has curious implications for our 
cherished shibboleth that the government closest to home is also 
the most responsive to local conditions and the most accountable 
to its constitutents. 
Summary. So far we have been considering the difficulties with 
testing a law for rationality that are intrinsic to the process of judi-
cial review itself. To summarize: the test depends on attributing 
a purpose to the lawmakers; but laws are often an accommodation 
of several unrelated purposes. Commonly, a law will push toward 
a goal only within the limits of objectives that may or may not be 
apparent in retrospect. Legislative declarations and legislative his-
tory cannot be relied on to reflect the actual balance of considera-
tions that shaped the law, and often no such records are available. 
Although proponents might have wished for more and opponents 
for less, all that is certain about the law as a means to an end is 
that a majority could be found to undertake what the law in fact 
undertakes, no more, no less. That much is its immediate goal. If 
59. People ex rel. Orcutt v. Instantwhip Denver, Inc., 176 Colo. 896, 490 
P.2d 940 (1941) and cases cited therein, at 943; Carolene Products Co. 
v. Banning, 131 Neb. 429, 268 N.W. 313 (1936). 
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judicial review may hold a law invalid for failure to match some 
greater purpose, it places a premium on the manner in which coun-
sel and court -phrase the supposed legislative goals. Many of our 
laws simply reflect old notions of right and wrong, or sympathy 
toward the equity of some particular claim to legislative considera-
tion, without intending to achieve any pragmatic aim. Such a law 
may be unconstitutional if it pursues a goal that the Constitution 
forbids, but not because the values it reflects are merely sentimen-
tal, or parochial, or old-fashioned, or foolish, rather than goal-
oriented. 
Even a law originally enacted to serve one pragmatic end, such 
as health or safety, will remain on the books as long as other vested 
interests that have grown up around the law retain legislative sym-
pathy. Building codes once written to assure safe standards 
of materials and construction survive technological changes 
because they protect existing sources of materials and employment. 
The gasoline tank ordinance in the Oregon example would not 
easily be amended to allow 10,000 gallon tanks because of the com-
petitive disadvantage this would inflict on all the service stations 
that complied with the old limitation. The same is true of the allo-
cation of licensed work between opticians and optometrists, or 
barbers and beauticians, which is being much litigated at present.60 
Delay in changing old laws for such reasons may stand in the way 
of progress, but it cannot be called an irrational means toward the 
ends served by legislative inaction. So far as I know, neither does 
the due process clause deny our political process such policy choices 
60. See, e.g., Maryland State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 
496, 312 A.2d 216 (1973), invalidating a law under which only bar-
bers, but not cosmetologists (of either sex), were licensed to style 
male hair. The Maryland court held that the law failed the ''ra-
tional relation" standard of equal protection because there was no 
difference between male and female hair. Id. at 508, 312 A.2d at 223. 
It also held that the same lack of "real and substantial relation to the 
object sought to be attained," purportedly standards of hygiene or 
competence, also violated due process. Id. at 512, 312 A.2d at 225. 
When did the legislature commit this violation? The court wrote 
(on a point of interpretation) that "[t]o suggest that the legislature 
in 1935 was so possessed of clairvoyance that it could foresee such 
phenomena of the 1970s as the hirsute male and the 'unisex' hair 
salon, simply strains credulity." Id. at 505, 321 A.2d at 221. The 
court did not inquire whether the cosmetologists had sought due 
process from the lawmakers when these phenomena occurred. But 
suppose that such a request for amendment were rejected after due 
deliberation because of objections of barbers hard pressed by the 
change in fashions to retain their traditional share of the hair care 
market. Would this legislative inaction be an irrational means? 
Would it have an impermissible end? 
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as, for instance, to sacrifice economic efficiency in order to preserve 
the livelihood of bricklayers, or independent druggists, or dairy far-
mers. In any event, the ostensible issue of rational means turns 
once again into an issue of the legitimacy of ends. 
Finally, judicial review of rationality is irretrievably ambivalent 
about time-whether to match past facts to past purposes, or pre-
sent facts to past purposes, or present facts to present purposes-
because it is ambivalent about its premise, whether it means to 
review the one-time reasonableness of lawmakers or the continuing 
reasonableness of laws. 
III. "RATIONALITY" AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
Let us turn from the problems of instrumental rationality as 
a premise for judicial review to its problems as a premise for law-
making. I venture again the proposition that no court should 
invalidate an act of government for failure to comply with a con-
stitutional rule unless the asserted rule is one with which the gov-
ernment should have complied, or should know how to comply with 
in the future. The institutional view mentioned earlier finds it not 
only possible but natural that there should be one formula for how 
government may legislate, and another under which judges review 
legislation; the different formulations merely reflect the division 
of labor between lawmakers and courts in our constitutional sys-
tem. One might, indeed, imagine a constitution in which one clause 
simply instructs judges to set aside unreasonable, unjust, or out-
moded laws, and as institutionalists we might say that this describes 
exactly the kind of constitutions we in fact have. But the actual 
clauses that we are discussing instruct government itself to act by 
due process of law, not simply to legislate subject to later judicial 
second-guessing. It is the alleged violation of a rule which govern-
ment was bound to respect that gives rise to judicial review. This, 
at least, is the classical theory. And theory aside, lawmakers must 
in practice be able to comply with the demands of the doctrines 
of constitutional law if they are to make laws that can survive 
review under these doctrines. Legislators, government counsel, and 
lobbyists, as well as academic observers, owe the formulas the 
respect of taking them seriously. Keep in mind that to give new 
bite (in Professor Gunther's phrase) to the formula about rational 
lawmaking means that a judge is to assess the challenged law in 
relation to actual, not merely conjectural, purposes, and that he 
is similarly to gauge the reasonableness of doubtful means by realis-
tic materials in the record and not by hypothetical rationaliza-
tions. 61 
61, Gunther, supra note 151 at 20-22, 
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What, then, does the formula demand of lawmakers? The model 
of the legislative process that it demands was described some years 
ago by Professor Julius Cohen, who was then a distinguished 
teacher of legislation at the University of Nebraska Law School.62 
It looks something like this: A rational policy must be one that 
is designed to move events toward some goal. At a minimtL>n, 
therefore, it requires three elements: some knowledge of pres-
ent conditions; the identification of a preferred future, or a goal; 
and a belief that the proposed action will contribute to achieving 
the desired goal, a belief that is sometimes called the instrumental 
hypothesis. Of these elements, the decision on the goal is plainly 
a value judgment; knowledge of the present situation and the in-
strumental hypothesis each involve judgments about facts, about 
cause and effect. 
The choice of action, however, involves elements beyond these 
three. If you know where you are and where you wish to go, there 
remains the choice between getting there quickly by car or more 
cheaply on foot. This is again a choice between different values, 
even when we assign some common denominator to the values of 
time, of yoilr need for exercise and fear of being mugged, and of 
exposing yourself to polluted air when walking and your qualms 
about adding to pollution by driving. If rationality requires you 
to compute these elements, you are likely to stay where you are, 
and so is a legislature. Finally, there is the political element. If 
another member of the family wants to use the car, is an argument 
worth the strain on other goals that you seek in your relationship? 
When a policy is to be made, not by one decisionmaker, but 
collectively over a period of time, by an assembly of equals with 
different views of both ends and means, the ranking and accom-
modation of competing priorities become the most decisive element 
of all. 
Rational lawmaking, if we take the formula seriously, would 
oblige this collective body to reach and to articulate some agree-
ment on a desired goal. It would oblige legislators to inform them-
selves in some fashion about the existing conditions on which the 
proposed law would operate, and about the likelihood that the pro-
posal would in fact further the intended purpose. In order to weigh 
the anticipated benefits for some against the burdens the law would 
62. Cohen, Hearing on a Bill: Legislative Folklore?, 37 MmN. L. REV. 
34 (1952). Professor Cohen divided the elements into the present 
fact situation, the means-ends hypothesis, and the instrumental value 
judgment, and defined the last to mean that "the immediate end 
sought would be instrumental in achieving an even higher or more 
inclusive end or goal." Id. at 34. 
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impose on others, legislators must inform themselves also about 
those burdens. These demands on the legislative process imply 
others. The projections and assessments of conditions and conse-
quences must presumably take some account of evidence, at least 
in committee sessions. A member who never attends the com-
mittee meetings should at least examine the record of evidence 
before casting .a vote, or be told about it, and should certainly 
never vote by proxy. The committee must explain its factual and 
value premises to the full body. Surely there is no place for a 
vote on final passage by members who have never read even a 
summary of the bill, let alone a committee report or a resume of 
the factual documentation. In the forty-nine states which are less 
progressive than Nebraska, the second house of the legislature could 
hardly substitute a wholly different version of the bill without 
repeating the process of inquiry. 63 These kinds of demands are 
implicit in due process, if lawmakers are really bound to a rule 
that laws must be made as rational means toward some agreed pur-
pose. 
Of course, this sketch has been broadly drawn to emphasize its 
contrast with reality. As a model it is highly commendable, except 
that its enormous requirements of time would limit its use to a 
handful of new legislative proposals involving technical issues. In 
fact, at least the committee stage in Congress and in the better state 
legislatures probably resembles the model more often than does the 
situation described by Professor Cohen when he wrote in despair 
about the folklore of legislative hearings. 64 As the changing role 
of government replaces spare-time politicians with full-time profes-
sional legislators, this latter group eventually acquires both a 
greater stake in the permanence of their jobs and a different sense 
of the time and potential for becoming informed, a demand for the 
services of competent staff, higher expectations on the quality of 
lobbying, and most important, a longer attention span to the past 
and foreseeable evolution of policy issues. But at its best, the legis-
lative process is a far cry from the deliberative search for agreed 
ends and the informed assessment of means that is postulated by 
the instrumentalist model. 
63. Nebraska has a one-chamber legislature, the Unicameral. NEB. 
CONST. art. III, § 1. 
64. Cohen, supra note 62. Professor Cohen deplored the use of hearings 
as mere public echo chambers for predetermined positions and argu-
ments. He urged the preparation of policy analyses by professional 
staffs not simply committed to supporting the chairman's political 
views, a development which has made substantial headway in some 
of the major Congressional committee staffs. See also Cohen & Rob-
son, The Lawyer and the Legislative Hearing Process, 33 NEB. L. REV. 
523 (1954). 
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Lawmaking and Administration. We do, in fact, have one law-
making process that is held, by and large, to the requisites of ra-
tional policy-making that I have sketched. It is the administrative 
process. When officials are delegated the authority .to perform 
some prescribed function, to manage a program, or to pursue some 
stated objective, no matter how broad their discretion may be, 
they are obliged to justify their actions in instrumentalist terms, as 
means toward a goal within the scope of their assignment. From 
this obligation, with or without the aid of administrative procedure 
acts or statutory standards of judicial review, courts have spun out 
various procedural duties of agencies which require them to artic-
ulate their aims and their assumptions of fact, to examine available 
evidence and consider alternative solutions, and sometimes to sub-
ject their hypotheses to scrutiny and possible rebuttal by interested 
parties. In one case of enormous practical importance which de-
pended upon such assumptions, Congress had left it to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to delay automobile emis-
sion standards from 1975 to 1976 only if the administrator found 
that adequate technology would not be available by the statutory 
date. After much study, the administrator declined to exercise 
this power. The reviewing court remanded the decision to EPA 
in order to afford the automobile industry not only a chance to 
challenge EPA's methodology but also to subject it to limited 
cross-examination.65 Judge J. Skelly Wright recently warned 
against implying such procedures simply from the agency's duty 
of rational decision. 66 But if Congress itself set both a pollution 
standard and its effective date for some less influential industry 
than the automobile industry, without basing the standard on any 
agreed methodology or without considering the industry's case 
against its feasibility, Judge Wright's colleagues would not hold 
this to deny due process even if it shut the industry down. What-
ever may be required of agencies in the pursuit of stated goals, it 
is clear that due process imposes no such model of rational inquiry 
on legislative bodies that select and compromise opposing versions 
of truth and justice in a single act of lawmaking. 
In Townsend v. Yeomans,67 tobacco warehousemen in Georgia 
complained about a statute which fixed their rates and alleged that 
the legislature had made no effort to learn what it was legislating 
about. In effect plaintiffs offered to prove that the lawmakers had 
65. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
66. Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of 
Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974). 
67. 301 U.S. 441 (1937). 
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acted in ignorance, and it appears that they called some legislators 
as witnesses to the fact. They might have had a case, if the rates 
had been set by an administrative commission, 68 but as an attack 
on legislation the Supreme Court gave the claim short shrift. 
"There is no principle of constitutional law which nullifies action 
taken by a legislature, otherwise competent, in the absence of a 
special investigation,'' wrote Chief Justice Hughes. "[T]he Legisla-
ture ... is presumed to know the needs of the people of the state. 
Whether or not special inquiries should be made is a matter for 
the legislative discretion."69 In a more recent case, plaintiffs com-
plained that a New York law banning the sale of alligator shoes, 
along with the skins of other supposedly endangered species, was 
enacted without an opportunity for them to offer or to dispute evi-
dence on the question of danger to the species involved. Hearings 
had earlier been held on a different bill concerning the same sub-
ject matter, but in. any event said the court, "there is no constitu-
tional requirement that the legislature conduct hearings and build 
a record when it passes a law."70 
What is true of hearings is equally true of the other pr~ 
requisites of rational policy analysis that I sketched earlier. Legis-
latures must follow some form of rational fact-finding, like courts 
and agencies, only in the rare cases when they adjudicate individual 
rights, as in contempt and impeachment and probably when 
expelling a member, but not when they legislate. 71 A bill need 
not be explained by its sponsor on introduction-it may, indeed be 
introduced "by request" with the sponsor's candid admission that 
he does not understand it-nor must it be referred to committee, 
nor is it necessary that passage be preceded by debate. Bills have 
been introduced and passed in a single day under claim of emer-
gency and suspension of rules. A bill need not declare any purpose 
nor recite any legislative findings. It may be enacted by mem-
bers whose minds are wholly closed to reasoned argument because 
of prior commitment to one point of view, ignorance and misinfor-
mation, lack of interest and lack of time, or simply because of 
absence of any opportunity for inquiry and debate. 
Procedures like these are indefensible when one takes seriously 
the notion that due process commands a legislature first to agree 
68. But cf. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944). 
69. 301 U.S. at 451. 
70. Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
71. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486 (1969); cf. United States v. Brewster, 401 U.S. 501, 518-20 (1972) 
and 542-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Factual disputes in election 
contests are heard in quasi-judicial proceedings. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 381-
96 (1970). 
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on a purpose and then to assess the efficacy of the proposed means 
to accomplish it. They would not be allowed in administrative rule-
making-for example, if the ban on alligator shoes were laid down 
by a conservation commission, acting o:ri the motion of one of its 
members who had been given misinformation, without knowing an 
alligator from a crocodile, making no effort to determine if either 
of them was an endangered species, and having given no prior 
notice permitting interested persons to submit arguments on the 
issue. But the distinction between the processes of legislation and 
the processes of its administration runs deep in constitutional law. 
It surfaces in two antitrust cases in which trucking companies 
claimed that their competitors conspired to use the machinery of 
government against them. In the first,72 Justice Black wrote for 
the Court that even a campaign to obtain favorable action by de-
ception, manufacture of bogus sources of reference, and distortion 
of public information had to be endured in .the kind of "no-holds-
barred fight" that is "commonplace in the halls of legislative bod-
ies."73 However, the sequel case74 left open the possibility of a 
different result when lies and misrepresentations were directed 
at an agency, at the instrumental process of administering a law 
rather than at the political process of enacting a law. The distinc-
tion is commonplace in judicial review of the actions of local gov-
ernments, which .typically place lawmaking and administration in 
the same hands-commonplace but often incoherently stated, be-
cause opinions submerge the need to distinguish carefully between 
an elected body's political selection of policy goals and its execution 
of previously enacted policies in meaningless platitudes about pre-
sumptions of regularity on the one hand and arbitrariness on the 
other.7·5 
An obligation that lawmakers design and evaluate every law as 
a means to an end beyond itself would demand of policy-making 
the rational procedures of policy implementation. If there is any 
doubt that due process makes no such demands on the process of 
political decision, the ultimate test of the theory lies in that pride 
and joy of western lawmaking, the popular initiative. Initiated 
laws like all others must meet constitutional standards. They will 
fail if by design or in effect they overstep constitutional bounds.76 
72. Eastern R.R. Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 
(1961). 
73. Id. at 144. 
74. California Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
75. See, e.g., Comment, Quasi-Legis1ative Acts of Local Administrative 
Agencies: Judicial Review, 7 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 111 (1972), and 
the California cases reviewed therein. 
76. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U,S. 369 (1967) (amendment to the 
California Constitution forbidding open housing laws); Pierce v. 
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But can it be contended that one of those standards is a rational 
way of matching means to ends? The initiative process flies in the 
face of the idea. Whatever the private goals of the sponsors, once 
a measure is drafted it is past systematic factfinding, analysis, 
amendment, or compromise. Aside from newspaper editorials or 
an occasional official voters' pamphlet, the debate leading to deci-
sion is left to the electioneering slogans of competing advertising 
firms.77 Yet such a measure may repeal, alter, or contradict the 
most carefully studied and best designed enactment of the legisla-
ture. If this mode of policy-making lacks some of the deliberative 
virtues of a republican form of government, that criticism failed to 
move the Supreme Court in 1912;78 and the California Supreme 
Court was surely right last December when it held that due process 
did not forbid the voters of San Diego to limit the height of build-
ings by use of a popular initiative and without any hearings or 
other institutional procedures.79 But note again: the initiative is 
generally allowed for "legislative" and not for "administrative" 
actions. 
Does constitutional law, then, demand nothing of the legislative 
process as a policy-making system? I trust my view of it will not 
strike you as hopelessly bleak, nor my defense of it as cynicism. 
I intend quite the opposite. If one thinks it cynical that laws need 
not be rational means toward high purposes, one implies that 
democracy must be justified by its capacity to produce such rational 
laws. Personally, I would rather avoid the converse that follows 
if it is shown that a non-democratic form of government can decree 
more effective measures toward more coherent national goals, as 
is often the case.80 But in fact the law does set standards for legiti-
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (law requiring education in 
public schools only). 
77. For a discussion of remedies where voters in a referendum have been 
misled by the wording of the ballot or other official source, see Note, 
Avoidance of an Election or Referendum When the Electorate Has 
Been Misled, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (1957). 
78. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
79. San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 305, 
529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974). Justice Tobriner rejected the 
due process claim of Building Contractors as "founded on an errone-
ous premise" in view of the "established constitutional principle" 
that notice and hearing have never been required for the enactment 
of general legislation. Id. at 211, 213, 529 P.2d at 573, 574, 118 Cal. 
Rptr. at 149, 150. 
80. For counter-democratic implications of instrumentalist legal think-
ing in developing countries, see Trubek, Toward a Social Theory 
of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE 
L.J. 1, 18-21 (1972). Trubek's distinction between an instrumentalism 
of means-ends rationality and an instrumentalism of process in the 
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mate lawmaking, as we shall see. There is hope. Only it is not 
found in a duty to legislate by the m<ithods of rational policy 
analysis. · 
Before we turn to those other standards, let us sum up the 
distinction between the kind of lawmaking that must he prepared 
to defend the rationality of its decision process and the kind that, 
in my view, need not do so. The distinction does not lie in the 
numbers of interested parties that may be affected by the decision 
nor in whether it rests on general or specific facts. Those lines 
concern the limits of the right to be heard and dispute evidence, 
limits developed on the foundation Justice Holmes laid down in his 
Bi-Metallic opinion.81 But even though the Colorado Board of 
Equalization in that case did not have to listen to all the tax-
payers of Denver, and thus not to any of them, it still had to 
use some rational process to decide that Denver had underassessed 
.their property. Is the distinction, then, whether the policy makers 
are appointed or elected? Many state and local agencies are elected, 
presumably to reflect community desires more directly. But this 
·does not give an elected board of equalization, or a utility commis-
sion or a school board greater freedom to proceed irrationally than 
their appointed counterparts elsewhere. 
The duty to defend the rationality of a decision, I suggest, 
depends very simply on whether the policy makers are limited to 
prescribed aims, or whether they aie free to pursue any aim of 
their own choice. Most lawmaking bodies have assignments which, 
however broadly stated, are nevertheless finite. This is true of city 
councils, for instance, even under constitutional home rule. Many 
constitutional claims in federal courts would be unnecessary if 
judges would first make counsel brief, for example, whether a 
school board has been empowered by its statute to improve the per-
sonal appearance of students or the private lives of teachers. 82 
But state laws, whether made by legislators, by popular initiative, 
or even by courts, are an exercise of the state's plenary authority 
to address or not to address any perceived need, to pursue or not 
to pursue any vision of social goals, subject only to constitutional 
limitations. Unless, then, an impermissible goal is charged against 
the lawmakers, unless the attack is on the legitimacy of their policy 
rather than its rationality, the policy can constitutionally be a 
competitive politics of a pluralistic society is consistent with the con-
stitutional theory discussed here. 
81. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
82. See, e.g., Neuhaus v. Federico, 12 Ore. App. 314, 505 P.2d 939 (1973); 
Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Reg-
ulate Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 
U. PA. L. REV. 373 (1969). 
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means to do exactly what it does do, no more, no less. It cannot 
be considered as lacking logical relation to an end if the end can 
be anything that is not forbidden. 
Candor and Hypocrisy. The response, on the part of proponents 
of the doctrine of instrumental rationality, is that by insisting on 
the identification of purposes, whatever they may be, the doctrine 
promotes candor in the legislative process. 83 Candor in giving rea-
sons for a policy can be a mixed blessing. It may result in invali-
dating a policy for faulty premises even though it would be quite 
desirable if based on different reasons. In the administrative law 
area, we expect :to pay this price for giving reasons. We are re-
minded by Judge Leventhal that the ex post facto rationalizations 
of counsel cannot take the place of reasoned decision-making by 
the agency. 84 But are we prepared to live consistently by the doc-
trine of "reasons before conclusions" even in administrative policy-
making? Most law schools, to choose ·an example close to home, 
use a special admissions process for minority applicants. Why they 
do so, as every constitutional law professor knows, is debated 
always in terms of a justification that can survive equal protection 
analysis, and not in a search for agreement on the premises of the 
program. Arguments about the relevance of alleged cultural bias 
in academic and LSAT scores, about the legitimacy of compensa-
tory preferences, about the special social contribution of minority 
lawyers or the pedagogic advantages of a heterogeneous classroom 
are pursued in law reviews, but they are not brought to a decision 
in the individual institution before action is taken. 85 Some of these 
arguments have merit, some do not, and a choice among them 
would logically affect the nature of the program. But no one 
expects special minority admissions to stand at one law school or 
fall at another on the strength of the school's means-ends analysis. 
What law schools know they want is a minority program, and any 
83. Gunther, supra note 15, at 47; Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 
HARV. Crv. RrGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 269, 287 n.54, 299-300 (1975). 
A different argument than candor is that policies of major impor-
tance or touching sensitive rights should be required to be made only 
by explicit legislative enactments, so as to assure that they represent 
the deliberate decision of the politically responsible legislature. See 
Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation, 
63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 645-55 (1975), discussing precedents for this de-
mand. 
84. National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Ingersoll, 
497 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962), citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 
U.S. 194 (1947), which sustained an order previously reversed for 
faulty premises in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
85. See Gellhorn & Hornby, Constitutional Limitations on Admissions 
Procedures and Standards-Beyond Affirmative Action, 60 VA. L. 
REv. 975, 1002-11 (1974), for proposals for bringing standards and 
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reason that the Court finds to be legitimate will gladly be adopted 
retrospectively as the reason for each school's policy. 
Articulated reasons have their place in an agency's pursuit of 
the goals assigned to it. Pursued into the legislative process, the 
hope for ca.11dor is more likely to produce hypocrisy. Recitals of 
findings and purposes are the task of anonymous draftsmen, com-
mittee staffs, and counsel for interested parties, not legislators. 
Such recitals will be an attempt to provide whatever, under pre-
vailing case law, is expected to satisfy a court. Except for this 
purpose, a legislator has no reason to care about them nor to 
debate their truth or relevance as long as he favors the bill. 
It is improbable that testimony about the amount of food that 
was not being sold to potential black customers in segregated res-
taurants produced any new votes for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
not even from congressional districts that import coffee or pro-
duce Coca Cola.86 Earlier, in legislating for humane methods of 
slaughter, a Senate committee felt obliged to add to the goal 
of preventing needless suffering an assertion that inhumane 
slaughter adversely affected public acceptance of meat products. 87 
Congress, of course, does have to relate its bills to some function 
assigned to it, while a state legislature needs only to avoid forbidden 
ground. In its recent session, the Oregon Legislature, flushed with 
victory over throw-away bottles and cans, 88 took on aerosol sprays. 
The senate bill was prefaced by half-a-dozen assertions about the 
danger of fluorocarbons to the ozone layer, a matter which an attor-
ney for opponents pointed out was a rather distant reason for one 
state to burden interstate commerce. Meanwhile, another constitu-
tional lawyer suggested to counsel for the house committee the 
addition of a recital that aerosols also endanger some persons' 
health down on the ground in Oregon. Attention to this finding 
was duly recorded in the taped debate, and the senate accepted the 
house amendment to the findings.89 Note that this repair job was 
wholly the work of lawyers who knew nothing about ozone or the 
procedural fairness into the admissions process. I have not heard of 
any university that has followed administrative rulemaking procedure 
in articulating its law school admissions program, despite the enormous 
pressure recently on admissions. 
86. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, was 
sustained in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). The 
recitals in this instance were made in committee, not in the text of 
the act. For a critique of this invocation of the commerce power, see 
G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 217-18 
(9th ed. 1975). 
87. S. REP. No. 1724, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). 
88. See American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Ore. 
App. £18, 517 P.2d 691 (1973). 
89. DIGEST OF OREGON LAws, c. 366, S.B. 771 (1975). 
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medical effects of inhaling fluorocarbons, and it hardly affected one 
vote for or against outlawing aerosol cans. If the law would have 
been invalid with only statements about ozone, what should be its 
fate with the added recital? Or with no recitals at all? Should it 
matter to the fate of an act if statements about it are demonstrably 
false? We have it on the high authority of Justice Frankfurter that 
the truth or falsity of congressional findings in a bill was imma-
terial, when the Court pushed aside the attack of the Communist 
Party on a veritable essay of findings that prefaced the Subver-
sive Activities Control Act of 1950.90 How much attention Con-
gress pays to such recitals was illustrated when these findings 
about the "world Communist movement" of 1950 were reenacted 
unchanged in a 1968 revision, without reference to the historic 
developments of eighteen years.91 
The fact of the matter is that legislatures do not decide 
separately on the goals of a policy and on the proposed means, 
where to go and how to get there. The vote is on the means, not 
on the ends. The means are what will happen, the ends may or 
may not happen, depending in part on what near or distant objec-
tive one has in mind. The crucial thing is that the means them-
selves are somebody's end; that alone can get a bill enacted. Some-
times people want to use the car rather than walk, no matter where 
they may end up. 
The point appears never more sharply than when the policy 
process consciously tries to measure its instrumental rationality, for 
instance, by determining the benefit-cost ratio of a proposed 
project. Thoughtful students of policy analysis often stress its 
limited role in the overall context of political decision, its function 
of clarifying choices rather than of demonstrating the "right" 
choice, particularly on the part of government staffs that are not 
themselves politically responsible for the final decision. When 
he was Deputy Director of the Budget, Defense Secretary James 
R. Schlesinger once commented -to a Senate committee on the 
"ancient political tradition" which makes it more important that 
a widely perceived problem be addressed on the symbolic level than 
that the action taken have a high likelihood of success. The sym-
bolic impulse behind much governmental action will often gain 
votes for "ready-made solutions in search of a problem" which their 
promoters and beneficiaries in and out of government may long 
have sought to enact or to enlarge. Schlesinger said that particu-
larly in spending schemes, "it is an effective device to associate their 
programs, frequently quite irrelevant, with currently popular goals, 
90. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Con-
trol Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
91. 5(} u.s.c. § 781 (1968). 
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frequently quite laudable, notwithstanding the fact that the pro-
posed solution may not make even a dent in the problem. . . . The 
fact that an activity is indefensible in analytical terms does not 
mean that it will lack for defenders."92 Even projects with 
benefit-cost ratios well below 1.0 will be enacted in the face of the 
knowledge that they cannot be rationalized by the most generous 
hopes for their ostensible purposes. Does the Constitution forbid 
such an enactment? 
Indeed, when we turn from spending programs, whose political 
justification may be the very realistic one of allocating work and 
wealth to the suppliers of the goods or services involved-the con-
struction or aerospace industries, farmers, even teachers or social 
workers-as much as any need for those goods or services, to the 
older kind of social legislation that places the burden of progress 
on those whom it regulates, a very low prospect of effectiveness may 
be the sine qua non of winning enactment of the law at ·all. Only 
after amendments excluding favored and vulnerable groups, en-
trusting enforcement to diffuse and feeble agencies, hedging it 
with slow and repetitive procedures, and assuring control over per-
sonnel and budget in safe hands can a majority be put together of 
those who want results and those who are willing to share in the 
symbolic affirmation of principle as long as it causes no practical 
pain. Contrary to the instrumentalist canon, the ineffectiveness of 
a law to achieve its goal may be itself a policy, a policy shared by 
the act's opponents and some of its supporters, and may be the price 
for permitting the law to reach enactment. 
Dr. Schlesinger, I point out, was describing the policy process, 
not complaining about it. His point was that analysis can tell legis-
lators when a proposal lacks rational justification, but the decision 
remains theirs. Consider whether such enlightenment helps or 
hurts the validity of an act, if we take seriously the notion that 
legislative acts are obliged to be rational means to .their ends. 
Is it more rational, or less, to adopt a policy after weighing 
the knowledge that it does not meet utilitarian tests, than it is 
to adopt it in ignorance and hope? The paradox disappears when 
we recognize that nothing limits a lawmaker to purposes that qual-
ify for benefit-cost analysis. People have reasons for wanting 
a law, and the lawmaker will see a value in meeting their wishes, 
quite apart from any practical good it may do. The oldest parts 
of the law-family law, for instance, and much of the criminal law 
-embody norms that are strongly held values for their own sake 
92. Heari?J-gS on Planning-Programming-Budgeting System Before the 
Subcomm. on National Security and International Operations of the 
Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5 at 305-11 
(1969). 
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and not as means to a further end. Do we need, or want, a utili-
tarian explanation for laws that limit the legal relation of marriage 
to partners of opposite sex, or distribute intestate property by 
degree of kinship? 
When the challenge is to a law that reflects such a non-rational 
human impulse, judges will sometimes try to credit the law's 
acceptance of that impulse with being itself a rational policy. For 
instance, many people no doubt support the death penalty from 
a sense that justice demands it in outrageous cases more than 
they really care how effective it is as a deterrent, but Justice 
Stewart finessed doubts about a non-pragmatic premise like retri-
bution by finding its recognition in the law useful after all: "The 
instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channel-
ing that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an 
important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed 
by law."93 
Again, few laws have been longer in search of a purpose than 
the laws against pornography. A majority of the Court has sus-
tained these laws as reflecting "imponderable aesthetic assump-
tions" about morality and the style and quality of life, without 
inquiry as to whether the lawmakers had in fact reached agreement 
on any diagnosis of the supposed harm or the efficacy of censor-
ship as a cure. 94 This is an approach very different from the 
search for rationality beyond mere Victorian taboos in the pregnant 
teachers' case.95 And indeed, if the impulse for laws that protect 
wilderness areas, endangered species, historic places, or the appear-
ance of cities, or that forbid cruelty to animals, could be pronounced 
rational only on the ground that it gives effect to another order 
of human self-satisfaction, the whole instrumentalist notion turns 
into tautology. On that score, it is quite as rational to reinstitute 
public hangings as to abolish the death penalty, or to raise revenues 
by licensing bullfights as to adopt a humane slaughter act, if this 
is what people really want. If there are limits, they must be found 
elsewhere than in a test of instrumental rationality. 
Finally, think again of the problems of time and change and 
inaction. If a court finds a law unconstitutional because facts have 
93. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
The futility of searching for means-ends rationality in our ambivalence 
toward punishment for crime was exemplified in the Oregon Constitu-
tion, where until 1964 the death penalty for murder was enshrined in 
the Bill of Rights along with the command that "laws for the punish-
ment of crime shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and 
not of vindictive justice." ORE. CONST. art. I,§ 15 (1963). 
94. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
95. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
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changed, this implies-using our premise that the government must 
have failed a duty to follow the Constitution-that there is a con-
stitutional obligation to make new laws. But what laws, and when 
is the obligation met? Suppose that after the Carolene Products 
Company changed the labels on its cans so ·that no consumer could 
possibly be confused, a legislator proposed to repeal the ban on 
filled milk because it no longer served its original purpose. May a 
legislative committee shelve the bill without hearings because dairy 
farmers object to new competition? May it hold hearings to ana-
lyze the economic impact of repeal and then shelve the bill? Or is 
the legislature obliged to reenact the existing law in order to base 
it on this changed purpose-for, after all, the inaction of a commit-
tee is not the rational judgment of the legislature as a whole? The 
Federal Trade Commission might be obliged to consider the change 
in labels, because the Commission's assignment does not include 
subsidizing dairy farmers; but a legislature, I repeat, is not the FTC. 
Suppose, again, that there is widespread agreement on a social 
goal, but that legislative agreement is not reached on the means. 
Each house, after careful study, passes a rational bill which, how-
ever, proves unpersuasive to the other house, or a compromise is 
vetoed because it diverges from a third rational plan of the execu-
tive. Of course we want more, we want action; but when there 
is no agreement on exactly what action, can we label the outcome 
unconstitutional for lack either of instrumental rationality or of 
due process? And with what consequence? A court cannot easily 
provide a substitute for a law which has not been made; at least 
it cannot outside the traditional areas of judge-made common law 
and equity. A few years ago, the Florida Supreme Court struck 
down' an old state statute against abortions in a judgment with 
only prospective effect and declared that, pending enactment of a 
new statute, prosecutions might proceed under what the court 
called the "common law offense of abortion."96 Could the legis-
lature have "enacted" this unwritten stop-gap into permanent law 
simply by failing to agree on a new statute? Or did this mode 
of making a criminal law, more than insufficient rationality of any 
law that the legislature might make, represent a denial of the due 
process of lawmaking? 
That brings us to the last stage of this excursion into con-
stitutional theory. 
IV. LEGITIMACY AND DUE PROCEDURE 
If the dogma that due process requires every law to be a rational 
means to a legislative end is itself not a rational premise for judi-
96. State v. !Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 1972). 
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cial review, and if it is even less plausible as a constitutional com-
mand to lawmakers, then what use is the due process clause for 
lawmaking? The time has come to look the clause itself in the 
eye. 
To propose a look at the due process clause, let us admit, casts 
doubt on this whole theoretical exercise. For that is not what one 
does in constitutional law. The fact that the political 'decisions about 
how we were to govern ourselves were written down after much 
debate and drafting in formal constitutions in 1776 and 1787, in 
amendments in 1791 and 1868, and at various other times, at first 
gave strength and legitimacy to judicial enforcement of lawful gov-
ernment but has since come to be regarded as something of an 
embarrassment. For how can we in the late 20th century treat 
our most crucial legal and political issues as the interpretation of 
these texts enacted by a few men, and no women, in a very dif-
ferent kind of society one hundred or two hundred years ago? Yet 
the texts are there, and other texts that might be there are not, 
and the machinery to change the texts exists and has often been 
used. It is a dilemma, the fundamental dilemma I suggested at 
the outset in saying that the Constitution is not common law and 
calling Justice Jackson to my defense. 
Of course, our intellectual resources rise easily to the task. The 
task, as we lawyers see it and have taught everyone else to see 
it, is judicial review. It requires room for judicial decision. And 
the first thing you must do to have room for decision under a 
written text-any text, be it a contract, a will, a statute, or a 
constitution-is to find that it is ambiguous at the least, preferably 
that it is obscure, and best of all, that it is deliberately broad and 
general for use in a variety of unforeseeable circumstances some-
time in the future. To assume that the draftsmen meant something 
precise of which we cannot now be certain is less satisfactory than 
to discover that they themselves did not agree, or agreed only on 
the most Platonic generalities, for this discovery lets us act not 
from an admission of ignorance but in the happy execution of their 
very plan. Particularly in "due process," the commentators, many 
of whom have also been judges, have seen the most Delphic among 
the Constitution's terms of "convenient vagueness,''97 phrased with 
"majestic" generality98 and "sententiousness."99 "Stately admoni-
97. Hough, Due Process of Law-To-Day, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218 (1918). 
See al.so Frankfurter's phrase, "purposed vagueness," supra note 6. 
98. Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme 
Court, 84 HARv. L. REV. 769, 784 (1971). 
99. Hand, Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function, 46 
CoLUM. L. REV. 696 (1946), reprinted in L. HAND, Tm: SPIRIT OF LIB-
ERTY 207 (1952). 
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tions," Judge Learned Hand called them, "with only that content 
which each generation must pour into them anew in the light of 
its own experience."100 
Far be it from me to say that a text is informative when so 
many, for so long, have found it to be only evocative. I suggest 
merely that a clause which forbids Government to deprive persons 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law appears, at 
least as a point of departure, to concern the process by which 
Government impinges on these interests of the individual rather 
than the reason why it does so.101 The. clause does not forbid 
the taldng of life, liberty or property-this was, and is, the central 
technique of criminal and civil law and most administrative regula-
tions-rather, it forbids doing so by an unlawful process. And 
indeed, without here going into the historical origins of the clause, 
among most of those who have done so it is commonly acknowl-
edged that due process originally referred to lawful procedure and 
was generally so understood for a hundred years after independ-
ence.102 
At its core, "process" meant trial, judicial proceedings, as it does 
today in French and in German; and the first edition of Story's 
treatise on the Constitution in 1833 disposed of fifth amendment 
due process with the single sentence: "This clause in effect affirms 
the right of trial according to the process and proceedings of the 
common law."103 From this core concept, it is no great leap to 
extend due process also to standards for administrative and other 
procedures, and one only has to go slightly further to hold that 
a legislature cannot enact any procedure which it chooses into due 
process of law.104 The evident focus of the due process clause on 
100. L. HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary, in Tm: SPIRIT 
OF LIBERTY 180 (1952). 
101. One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a con-
stitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial 
word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or 
words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted in 
meaning. 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissent-
ing)'. Justice Black objected to the fabrication of a constitutional 
"right of privacy" beyond the fourth amendment. Id. at 509, 510. 
102. See, e.g., 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 856 (1971); A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 363 
(1968); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Pro-
tection of the Laws", 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421 n.11; Hough, supra note 
94, at 223. 
103. Quoted in Hough, supra note 94, at 222. 
104. The much larger leap from provisions which in terms hold officials 
within the law and legal procedures to a generalized review of sub-
stantive legislation was taken in two steps. The issue was first 
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procedure can be somewhat blurred by tracing its relation to the 
earlier and more common clauses which held that Government had 
authority to act only according to the "law of the land," but this 
still does not take us beyond a claim to laws properly made. 
These clauses insisted on government according to law, but they 
hardly meant that the elected assemblies of a newly self-governing 
p·eople, any more than Parliament before them, were not to be 
able to make new laws. Even Corwin conceded that Sir Ed-
ward Coke, who provided the crucial link between the Magna 
Carta and our 18th century constitutional clauses, was concerned 
only with imposing procedural and institutional restraints on gov-
ernment; the natural rights philosophy of John Locke, while 
important to American constitutionalism, cannot fairly be assigned 
to the guarantees of procedure and legality expressed as "due 
process" and "law of the land."105 As to the notion that either 
clause commanded legislation to be rational, not merely in the 
sense of avoiding self-contradiction and impossibility of compli-
ance, but as reasonable means to an end, these phrases seem an 
unlikely way to state such a command on the part of men who 
were eminently able to put their political and legal prescriptions 
into English. 
"Process" as Process. The question before us is not what sub-
stantive rights may be found elsewhere within or outside of the 
Constitution, but what pertinence the due process clause may have 
for lawmaking when :the constitution-makers, at the time of the 
fourteenth amendment as much as at the time of the fifth, gave 
the term "due process" no more than a procedural connotation.106 
To extend it from procedure to substance was an aberration of the 
1890s. As Professor Bickel reminded us, neither Justice Brandeis 
nor Justice-to-be Frankfurter thought us intellectually bound to 
this,107 nor need we be bound to rely only on due process to 
hold the states to the privileges and immunities of the Federal Bill 
of Rights.108 Of course, precedent being what it is, I am not now 
whether, contrary to the view of, for instance, Alexander Hamilton, 
these provisions ran against an act of the legislature at all. The sub-
sequent non sequitur was that, if they did, they controlled not only 
novel and unfair procedural legislation but substantive legislation as 
well. See 2 B. Sc'HWARTZ, supra note 102; HOWARD, supra note 102, at 
303-05. 
105. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 50-51 (1948). 
106. Frank & Munro, supra note 102. 
107. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE !DEA OF PROGRESS 26, 186 n.34 
(1970); see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-73 (1927). 
108. Such substantive rights as were meant to be placed beyond depriva-
tion by the states are plainly better described by the words "privileges" 
and "immunities" than as interests in life, liberty or property which 
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speaking of how to brief your first constitutional case. But since 
we are engaged in an excursion into constitutional theory, let us 
examine the implications if we had followed Brandeis and returned 
"due process of law" to its procedural meaning. What might "due 
process of law" mean in lawmaking? 
The obvious answer is that government is not io take life, 
liberty, or property under <:olor of laws that were not made accord-
ing to a legitimate law-making process. There is nothing very ob-
scure in this reading of "due process," <:er.tainly nothing as obscure 
as finding in those words, or in "law of the land," a command that a 
validly made law is valid only as long as it serves the lawmaker's 
supposed purpose, or perhaps some different contemporary purpose. 
It means simply that the relevant question of due process in 
lawmaking is never what law was made, but how it was made. 
Of course, reading "process" to mean "process" requires us to 
decide which lawmaking processes are legitimate and which are not. 
Even if the answers are not always self-evident, at least this read-
ing poses the right questions. This is so not simply because we 
follow the procedural meaning of "due process"; they are the right 
questions because the answers make sense as constitutional direc-
government may take if it employs the correct process, although "due 
process" could incorPQrate the procedures provided in the Bill of 
Rights. Due process became the vehicle for extending federal sub-
stantive guarantees to the states because the Slaughter-House Cases, 
83 U.S. 36 (1873), in rejecting a broad, open-ended claim of business 
"privileges and immunities", had left those words without practical 
meaning. But the Slaughter-House Court, intent on denying the much 
broader reading, seems not to have considered whether the "privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States" might mean those 
which the Constitution gave Americans against the Government of 
the United States, i.e. the Bill of Rights. Perhaps this interPretation of 
"privileges alld immunities" cannot fairly be attributed to the drafts-
men of the fourteenth amendment in view of their references to 
Judge Bushrod Washington's (itself questionable) reading of the sim-
ilar words in Article IV when sitting as a circuit judge in Corfield v. 
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1823). See, e.g., 
CORWIN, supra note 105, at 118-19; Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privi-
leges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1967). But see Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). The 
high-water mark of the last effort to find a new theoretical footing in 
the privileges and immunities clause came in Edwards v. California, 
314 U.S. 160 (1941), in concurring opinions of Justices Jackson and 
Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Murphy. Professor Kurland 
recently suggested revival of the privileges and immunities clause, but 
apparently as a source of claims outside the first eight amendments. 
Kurland, The Privileges and Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come 
Round At Last"?, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405. 
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tives for the conduct of government in a way in which the formulas 
of substantive judicial review for rationality do not. It makes little 
sense to pretend that the fifth and fourteenth amendments in-
structed lawmakers constantly to review all laws for agreement on 
their purposes and their probable effectiveness; but it is not beyond 
the theoretical capacity of officials to know proper from improper 
processes of government, regardless of their willingness to abide by 
this knowledge in practice. 
For keep in mind that the manner in which our governments 
make law is itself governed by law. The legitimacy of govern-
ment-its composition, selection, and procedures-occupies a large 
part of the federal and state constitutions and, in the case of local 
governments, is grounded in statutes and charters. Laws govern 
even lawmaking by the people themselves. Some of these laws 
define the legitimacy of lawmaking institutions, for example the 
number of their members, their qualifications, their election, the 
length of their term in office. Others define the prerequisites of 
lawmaking procedure; for instance, the central concept of enact-
ment by a majority of a legal quorum, or sometimes a larger num-
ber; passage of the same text by two separate houses; the assent 
of an independent executive or reenactment after consideration of 
his objections. What is not fixed in constitutions and statutes 
is often spelled out in the rules of the lawmaking body itself. 
Bribery, the classic threat to the integrity of government, is 
universally outlawed by statute or constitution. The Court has 
spoken of the "due" functioning of the legislative process under the 
speech and debate clause.109 
Two things are striking about this body of rules for the lawmak-
ing process. One is that over the years its successive authors have 
measured the process, explicitly or implicitly, by the standard of 
its legitimacy-the basic constitutional standard of democratic ac-
countability or, if you will, of a republican form of government.110 
That is not a· universal practice in the world. The architects of our 
system have identified what from time to time they have perceived 
as prerequisites of legitimate lawmaking and as threats to its 
achievement, they have debated alternative solutions both in insti-
tutional and in procedural forms, and they have known how to state 
these solutions with considerable precision and detail. The second 
striking thing is that these rules of the lawmaking process, with 
some exceptions, are followed as a matter of course, unquestion-
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 
(1972) (emphasis in original). 
110. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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ingly, not with a constant weighing of possible sanctions for their 
violation. We would not say this with equal confidence about daily 
practice in the processes of criminal and administrative law. In 
short, due process in lawmaking in many, if not all, respects is a 
very concrete, well understood set of institutional procedures. 
This conscious and deliberate legitimization of the lawmaking 
process has never come to an end, frozen in the forms of 1789 or 
of 1868. The constituency entitled to select and to retire its law-
makers has been progressively enlarged by the fifteenth, the nine-
teenth, the twenty-fourth and the twenty-sixth amendments. Some 
states, such as my own State of Oregon, found means to enforce 
equal apportionment of legislative representatives before the Su-
preme Court extended this political equality to all states. In the 
19th century, the reaction to legislative recklessness, ignorance, log-
rolling, and corruption led to constitutional strictures on the forms 
and procedures of enactment, some of which we now find inap-
propriate.111 A number of states turned to the popular referen-
dum as a safeguard. Waves of reform have been aimed at local 
institutions and processes, with good reason. Not all of these 
efforts have proved wise, and contradictory views have prevailed 
in different states; but the impulse to secure responsible govern-
ment has not run its course. 
Indeed, we presently live in a period of the most intense 
attention to the lawmaking process since the burgeoning of new 
legislation and administrative regulation thirty years ago led to the 
Congressional Reorganization and Administrative Procedure Acts 
of 1946.112 By the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and 
its sequels, Congress has opened many previously closed proceed-
ings to public scrutiny, required members to cast recorded votes, 
and surrounded committee hearings and committee action with new 
safeguards of notice and rights of minority participation. It has 
equipped itself with procedures and professional staff intended to 
allow both majority and minority members to deal rationally with 
such problems as the economic impact of the budget and the conse-
quences of technological changes if they so choose.113 Environ-
mental impact statements are required for agency proposals to Con-
111. See, e.g., Nutting, The Enro!led Bill and the Validity of Legislation, 
15 NEB. L. BULL. 233, 238 (1937). 
112. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified 
in scattered sections of 2, 15, 31, 33, 40 U.S.C.) ; Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
113. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 31 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1301 et seq. (1975); Technology Assessment Act of 1972, 2 
U.S.C. §§ 471 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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gress as well as for administrative actions.114 Many states have 
seen the same efforts to strengthen the institutional capacities of 
lawmaking bodies and also their accountability, through new laws 
regarding open meetings, open records and conflicts of interest. 
Some require that every bill carry an estimate of its cost. 
Of course, our lawmaking process is not about to become 
perfectly responsible, perfectly accountable, perfectly democratic, 
even if these ideals did not conceal unresolved contradictions.115 
The point is, rather, that the process everywhere is governed by 
rules, that these rules are purposefully made and from time to time 
changed, and that most of them are sufficiently concrete so that 
participants and observers alike will recognize when a legislative 
body is following the due process of lawmaking and when it is not. 
There is generally no reason to doubt what process is called for. 
If a legislative body fails to reapportion itself when required, if 
it stops the clock in order to enact bills after the constitutional 
deadline,116 if absent members are counted as part of a quorum 
or as having voted, if impractical requirements for reading bills are 
ignored, the participants know that they are not complying with 
the constitution or can readily be reminded of it by anyone. The 
same is true of legislative procedures governed by rules other than 
a constitution, and of local lawmaking bodies. Those who cut pro-
cedural corners will argue practical justifications; they will deny 
culpability if no substantive injustice results, and the fact that 
improperly made laws are not invalidated no doubt encourages this 
pragmatic view; however, they will not claim ignorance of the rules. 
The problem with due process in lawmaking lies in the 
consequences of its violation. When a law is promulgated 
without compliance with the rules of legitimate lawmaking, is it 
not a law? Remarkably, we have no coherent national doctrine 
on this fundamental question. Judicial views on allowing a law 
to be attacked for faulty enactment differ from state to state and 
with the nature of the asserted fault; most courts and commenta-
tors find it improper to question legislative adherence to lawful 
114. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 
1164 (6th Cir. 1972); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(C) (1970). 
115. See Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Demo-
cratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PENN. L. REV. 810 (1974) with 
respect to Congress. 
116. See State ex rel. Cline v. Schricker, 228 Ind. 63, 88 N.E.2d 746 (1949), 
rehearing denied, 89 N.E.2d 547 (1950). When transcription of debates 
spreads to state legislatures, it can cause the demise of such procedural 
cheating. See, e.g., Johnston, The Legislative Process under the 1970 
Illinois Constitution, 8 JOHN MARsH. J. PRACT. & PROC. 251, 261 (1974-
75). 
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procedures.117 This reluctance is often phrased as a problem of 
proof, or of respect between coordinate branches, but these are 
rationalizations. Neither problem keeps courts from insisting on 
such adherence by executive officers118 or by local lawmakers, and 
those who oppose judicial review of faulty lawmaking on eviden-
tiary grounds will equally oppose it on uncontested pleadings or 
stipulations.119 Fear of legislative resentment at judicial interfer-
ence is not borne out by experience where procedural review exists, 
any more than it was after the Supreme Court told Congress that it 
had used faulty procedure in unseating Representative Adam Clay-
ton Powell.120 It is far more cause for resentment to invalidate 
the substance of a policy that the politically accountable branches 
and their constituents support than to invalidate a lawmaking pro-
cedure that can be repeated correctly, yet we take substantive 
judicial review for granted. Strikingly, the reverse view of pro-
priety prevails in a number of nations where courts have never 
been empowered to set aside policies legitimately enacted into law 
but do have power to test the process of legitimate enactment.121 
In any event these are problems of judicial review, and in our 
present theoretical excursion they are secondary to what the Con-
stitution demands of lawmakers. We do not assume that a law has 
been constitutionally made merely because a court will not set it 
aside, nor does the Supreme Court,122 despite Holmes's dictum 
117. See Grant, Judicial Control of Legislative Procedure in California, 1 
STAN. L. REV. 428 (1949); Lloyd, Judicial Control of Legislative Pro-
cedure, 4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 6 (1952); cf. Comment, Constitutional Pro-
visions Regulating the Mechanics of Statutory Enactment in Oregon-
Effect of Enrollment, 27 ORE. L. REV. 46 (1947). 
118. A recent decision insisting on precise procedures for exercising a 
cabinet officer's discretion is United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 
(1974) (wiretap authorization by attorney general). 
119. See Grant, supra note 117, at 447-48. 
120. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
121. See Dietze, Judicial Review in Europe, 55 M:rCH. L. REV. 539, 541· (1957); 
M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL RE\1IEw IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 99 n.8 
(1971). 
122. In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), appellants argued that an en-
rolled bill which omitted a section actually passed by both Houses of 
Congress did not become law by the President's signature. The Court 
said: 
In view of the express requirements of the Constitution the 
correctness of the general principle cannot be doubted. There 
is no authority in the presiding officers of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate to attest by their signatures, nor in 
the President to approve, nor in the Secretary of State to 
receive and cause to be published, as a legislative act, any bill 
not passed by Congress. 
Id. at 669. But the Court held that the error could not be proved 
on the evidence of the legislative journals, at least in any matter in 
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that law is only the prophecy of what courts will do.123 Other 
participants than courts have the opportunity, and the obligation, 
to insist on legality in lawmaking. When an objection is raised on 
a significant point of procedure in the Congress, the presiding offi-
cer and the members are obliged to address the point as one of 
legal principle, and they quite generally do so.124 A governor 
or a President ought to veto, on constitutional grounds, a bill that 
he knows to have been adopted in violation of a constitutionally 
required procedure, even though the courts would not question its 
enactment. If an attorney general advises prosecutors not to 
enforce a law enacted with the clocks stopped after a constitutional 
deadline, he acts to maintain due process despite the fact that a 
conviction under the law would be sustained. Congress itself pre-
fers to treat an improperly made act as never having become law 
even though the courts might not do so.125 It is not mere theory 
to distinguish between constitutional law and judicial review. 
The Problem of Relief. Yet the question of the consequences of 
noncompliance remains an obstacle to simply equating due process 
and compliance with prescribed rules for lawmaking. For the due 
process clauses do not command compliance with legitimate proce-
which the Constitution did not require that they be entered. Id. at 
670. Similarly, in United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892), the 
Court took for granted that the presence of a quorum and the vote 
required for passage were essential to the validity of the challenged 
statute, and it assumed that it might examine the journals for a vote 
on a roll call; however, the Court refused a challenge to the speaker's 
count of a quorum as reported in the journals. 
During the same era, the Supreme Court enforced state constitu-
tional requirements in cases where the state's practice included 
judicial enforcement. Post v. Supervisors, 105 U.S. 667 (1881); Town 
of S. Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U.S. 260 (1876). 
123. Holmes, supra note 1, at 461. 
124. Of course, this does not mean that their arguments or votes are 
motivated by the merits of the procedural issue when it arises in a 
strongly political or substantive context, such as the issue of changing 
the Senate's rule on cloture at the beginning of a new session, but even 
such debates must be cast in terms of procedural principle. With 
respect to the debate in the House of Representatives in Adam Clay-
ton Powell's case, see Linde, Comment on Powell v. McCormack, 17 
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 174 (1969). 
125. In 1963, Congress reenacted in its entirety an act of the previous 
session in which one provision was discovered to have been enrolled in 
error, after signature by the President. The committee report sug-
gested complete reenactment because the rule of Field v. Clark that 
federal courts will not look behind the enrolled bill would not apply 
to Congress itself. See note 122 supra. "Implicit in full reenactment 
is the legal conclusion that a bill not passed by Congress is not law, 
no matter who signs it .... " S. REP. No. 297, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 
3 (1963). 
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dure in the abstract; they state that no person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without such compliance. The guarantee 
runs in favor of the individual. But courts will not relieve indi-
viduals of the application of a law on every showing that it was 
improperly enacted. They are reluctant to visit the past sins of 
its legislative fathers on an otherwise inoffensive statute, especially 
when to do so seems a windfall for an undeserving but resourceful 
litigant. rt is not unlike the problem of letting the criminal go 
because the constable blundered,126 only, in the case of a statute, 
the consequences are far wider. This, and not problems of proof 
or institutional deference, is the ·practical reason to withhold judi-
cial review. But to deny an injured party relief from an improp-
erly made law means either that courts will tolerate violations of 
due process of law, or else that every breach of the prescribed 
process does not fall short of due process in the constitutional sense. 
The second of these will seem the more appealing solution, as it 
has been for the judicial view of due process in criminal and in 
administrative law. It sacrifices reading due process of laws to 
require adherence to law, and instead calls for deciding which 
standards of the lawmaking process are essential rto a valid enact-
ment and which are not. Due process of lawmaking will include 
some but not all of the rules governing the particular lawmaking 
body; it will also provide a constitutional standard below which 
no lawmaking process may fall. Of course, courts, as they have 
done in the past, can continue to insist directly on -compliance with 
rules beyond the demands of due process where this is the practice. 
Examples of this are rules governing the subject and titles of bills 
or the reading of proposed ordinances at properly convened meet-
ings. What the due process clauses add to such rules is the claim 
:to protection against injury to private life, liberty, or property, 
beyond the injury to the societal interest in legitimate government; 
and fourteenth amendment due process can add a federal floor 
under law making processes in the states.127 
126. See People v. Defore, 2.42 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Car-
dozo, J.). 
127. The text paragraph is illustrated by Londoner v. City & County of 
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). A property owner objected to a tax 
assessment because the decision to pave his street had been made with-
out the prior petition of landowners required by state law and because 
he had been denied an opportunity for a hearing. The Supreme Court 
held that since federal due process would not require a petition or 
other procedures before such a legislative decision, the failure to 
follow the procedure actually prescribed could not be a violation of 
due process; however, due process entitled the taxpayer to a hearing 
on his individual assessment. 
One federal court has recently said that a federal due process issue 
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This leaves a heavy agenda for due process, even when we fol-
low Brandeis and deny the clause any concern with what was done, 
but solely with how it was done. The agenda encompasses stand-
ards and remedies for the legitimacy of all lawmaking processes, 
including those of local governments and of boards and commis-
sions with lawmaking authority, though these need not all be iden-
tical standards or remedies. Yet many items on the agenda are not 
new to judges or lawmakers, though they have presented them-
selves under other labels than due process and have not been re-
lated to each other in any systematic way. State courts have long 
struggled to draw a line between fatal and non-fatal departures 
from the prescribed process by means such as labeling some con-
stitutional provisions "mandatory" and others merely "directory,'' a 
practice Cooley warned against a century ago.128 The draftsmen 
of open meeting laws and conflict of interest laws debate what con-
sequences should attach to non-compliance, and where they provide 
no answer, judges must.129 Courts have said that duress and coer-
cion will not invalidate a law when they have meant merely polit-
ical pressures by lobbying groups or strike threats by public em-
ployees;130 but our theory of due process has been spared the test 
of laws made in chambers occupied by armed groups, though a 
Southern view disputed the valid ratification of the fourteenth 
amendment itself on similar grounds.181 In theory, valid lawmak-
ing presupposes that there is a legitimate lawmaker before any 
procedure is undertaken, and local enactments are sometimes set 
aside if a participant was legally unqualified; but this is not done 
may be presented by the failure of a state to follow its own rules 
of law, Field v. Boyle, 503 F.2d 774, 779, n.6 (7th Cir. 1974), but there 
appears to be no precedent to support this dictum. 
128. See Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforcible Provisions of Constitutions, 80 
u. PA. L. REV. 54, 77 (1931)' quoting I. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS 159-60 (8th ed. 1927). Dodd reported that a half a dozen 
states followed California in inserting in their constitutions express 
declarations that all constitutional provisions were mandatory. Id. 
at 79. 
129. See Note, Conflicts of Interest of State Legislators, 76 HARv. L. REV. 
1209 (1963); Note, Conflicts of Interest of State and Local Legislators, 
55 IOWA L. REV. 45(} (1969). 
130. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 721, 532 
P.2d 495, 119 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1975); Dallasta v. Department of High-
ways, 153 Colo. 579, 387 P.2d 25 (1963). 
131. But cf. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). There the 
Supreme Court held that the legal outcome of an armed conflict over 
the government of an entire state was a question for Congress and 
the President. In a federal court, this case implicated the political 
structure of federalism, and, of course, it antedated the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, but a state court determining 
due process under a state's constitution would have a harder case. 
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with statutes. Again, the practical consequences make invalida-
tion seem too drastic a sanction. It was a foregone conclusion, when 
the Supreme Court held most state and local legislatures to be 
illegally constituted, that the laws made by these unconstitutional 
bodies would not for that reason be held void, a result which state 
courts had to rationalize in some fashion long before Reynolds v. 
Sims.182 
The scope of the proper remedy is a more difficult question than 
any doubt about what process of lawmaking was due, perhaps the 
most difficult question on the agenda. The apportionment cases 
illustrate reform through prospective orders, as do many open 
meeting statutes, and New Jersey has a unique declaratory action 
to review compliance with legislative procedure;133 but the condi-
tions for granting or for denying relief against the unlawfully made 
law lack principled explanation. The history of judicial fears for 
the reliability and stability of laws is as old as the history of judi-
cial review. Seven years after Marbury v. Madison,134 Marshall, 
in Fletcher v. Peck,185 argued at length why a law once made 
could not be set aside for having been procured by bribery and 
corruption. The holding, indeed, went further: although a newly 
elected legislature had described its predecessors' corruption as 
tantamount to usurpation, it could judge the validity of a law 
enacted by its predecessor even less than a court might do, if repeal 
would upset vested rights.136 How either courts or legislatures 
could cope with the illegitimate offspring of systematic corruption 
tr-0ubled the Justices throughout the 19th century.137 It is ironic 
132. 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); 
Ryan v. Tinsley, 316 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1963); cf. Blair v. Haynes, 
374 F. Supp. 913 GW.D. Mo. 1974). 
Judicial passivity in the face of a legislature's extreme departure 
from its constitution by persistently refusing to reapportion its dis-
tricts can only be explained by admitting that there are serious viola-
tions of constitutional process which courts will not correct, not by 
minimizing the fundamental illegitimacy of the process. 
133. See Application of McGlynn, 58 N.J. Super. 1, 155 A.2d 289 (1959); 
Grant, New Jersey's "Popular Action" in Rem to Control Legislative 
Procedure 4 RUTGERS L. REV. 391 (1950). 
134. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
135. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
136. Marshall speculated that to upset rights acquired under an unlaw-
fully made law might inherently be beyond the "nature of the legisla-
tive power" even "were Georgia a single sovereign power," apart from 
the constraints of the federal contract clause on which he rested the 
Court's decision. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810). 
See MAGRATH, YAHOO 128-39. ' 
137. See, e.g., J. FRANK, JusTICE DANIEL DISSENTING 204-12 (1964); McCurdy, 
Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Rela-
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that the very act which in the Slaughter-House Cases138 set iJhe 
Supreme Court upon its long struggle for a theory of the four-
teenth amendment was, in the words of a Louisiana court, the prod-
uct of "a wholesale bribery concern;"139 yet in all the debate about 
the privileges and immunities of the New Orleans butchers there 
was no discussion of whether a law thus bought and paid for might 
thereby be taking their liberty or property without due process. 
Again, it is judicial review and invalidation that is problematic, not 
the standard of legitimacy, for no one defends legislation by brib-
ery as the due process of lawmaking. 
Despite the reluctance to upset improperly made laws, however, 
efforts to tighten standards at other points of the policy process 
are eroding the bases •of .total non-intervention. When Brandeis 
mused about procedural due process in 1927, the impropriety of pay-
ing a mayor on the basis of fines collected from the enforcement 
of an ordinance might still be limited to his judicial or "quasi-
judicial" role,140 but fifty years later there is little doubt that 
the principle extends to the council members that legislate the 
ordinance. The doctrine that holds government agencies to their 
own rules has not stopped with adjudications but applies also to 
delegated policy-making.141 The Supreme Court holds Congress 
to its own rules in the case of investigations.142 Through the 
devices of declaratory judgment and allowing legislators standing 
as plaintiffs, as well as by decisions of concrete claims,143 both 
courts and the political branches have accepted review of the pol-
icy process to the point that pretexts of institutional deference can 
no longer cover the hard issues of relief. 
On another front courts are attacking the lawmaking process 
by pushing it toward forms of ~djudication, for instance in land-
use planning.144 The same thrust is implicit in the assault on 
tions: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 
61 J. AM.. liisT. 970 (1975). 
138. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
139. See Franklin, The Foundations and Meaning of the Slaughterhouse 
Cases, 18 TuL. L. REv. 1, 25 n.87 (1943); Durbridge v. The Slaughter-
house Co., 27 La. Ann. 676 (1875). 
140. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
141. See, e.g., Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973). 
142. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949). 
143. E.g., State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973) 
(claim to funds "impounded" by the President); cf. Train v. New 
York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); 
Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); State ex rel. Sego 
v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974) (state senator has 
standing to challenge item veto). 
144. See, e.g., South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 482 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 
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"conclusive presumptions" which the Supreme Court has levied 
against disfavored legislative generalizations. The concept is un-
promising as a guide for telling lawmakers when due process does 
or does not let them proceed by general laws, not much better 
than telling them not to legislate irrationally, but at least it pur-
ports to concern the process of policy formulation, not the 
policy.145 
Still another item for the agenda is the composition of lawmak-
ing bodies, in particular the delegation of policy choices from po-
197.3); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 
(1973); Sullivan, Araby Revisited: The Evolving Concept of Pro-
cedural Due Process Before Land Use Regulatory Bodies, 15 SANTA 
CLARA LAW. 50 (1974). For a critique of court-imposed judicialization 
of administrative rulemaking, see Wright, supra note 66. 
145. The experiment with "conclusive presumption" doctrine as an alterna-
tive to "irrational classification" has met a critical reception. See, 
e.g., Sewell, Conclusive Presumptions and/or Substantive Due Process 
of Law, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 151 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions 
as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: from Rodriguez to La Fleur, 62 
GEO. L.J. 1173 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An musory 
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975). A government cannot by asser-
tion in a law establish a fact whose existence is deemed constitution-
ally required for the validity of the law, e.g. that weapons or drugs 
have moved in interstate commerce. See Tot v. United States, 319 
U.S. 463 (1943); cf. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). If the 
pertinence of the supposedly "presumed" fact derives, not from some 
external requirement, but only from the purposes attributed to the 
lawmaker, the doctrine has the same shortcoming as review for 
rational classification. If, on the other hand, the Court seriously 
means to develop a class of decisions that may not be made by general 
criteria but only by individual adjudications-a true due process 
issue-it faces a hard task in defining this class of decisions by criteria 
expressed for use not merely by itself, but by lawmakers and lower 
courts. Compare United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (statu-
tory disqualification of Communists from union office held uncon-
stitutional as a bill of attainder) with Board of Governors v. Agnew, 
329 U.S. 441 (1947) (disqualification of underwriters from bank direc-
torship sustained) and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
(no individual determinations required to relocate citizens of Japa-
nese descent during war with Japan); cf. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Que-
sada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960) (rulemaking sufficient to disqualify 
commercial pilots at age 60); Aronstam v. Cashman, 132 Vt. 538, 325 
A.2d 361 (1974) (compulsory retirement of judges at age 70 not an 
invalid conclusive presumption). The Court itself has rested many 
of its best known constitutional doctrines on presumptions about 
human nature not subject to proof or rebuttal in a concrete case, e.g. 
the adverse impact of segregation on education, the "chilling effect" 
of some regulations on speech, or the deterrence of unlawful law en-
forcement by excluding illegally obtained evidence-a regrettable but 
widely approved style of explanation. See Linde, Judges, Critics, 
and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 238-42 (1972). 
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litically elected legislatures .to agencies composed of the designated 
representatives of interest groups. An example of this is the role 
given union leaders and business spokesmen in the 1971 Pay 
Board.146 Similarly, a New Jersey court faced a true dilemma of 
democratic theory when the most personally concerned and active 
proponent of a zoning amendment won election to the borough 
council; the court invalidated the ordinance because of his partic-
ipation.147 Another New Jersey court recently took the wrong 
road, I think, in reviewing a statute which specified the interest 
groups that alone could nominate appointees to the state Fish and 
Game Council; the court decided that the complaining parties' 
right to possible service on the board,. but not their right to disin-
terested policy-making, invalidated the statute.148 
146. In Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, (D.D.C. 
1971), Judge Leventhal reserved his doubts on this issue because plain-
tiffs had not argued it, "possibly because the Union has a different 
litigating interest." Id. at 763. Perhaps the validity of the Pay 
Board's power over wages in the private economy could be saved by 
its theoretical subordination to the Cost of Living Council. A cognate 
problem is presented by collective bargaining in the public sector, 
particularly when policies other than wages and benefits are involved. 
See Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 
83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974); Project, Collective Bargaining and Politics in 
Public Employment, 19 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 88-7 (1972). 
147. McNamara v. Borough of Saddle River, 60 N.J. Super. 367, 158 A.2d 
722 (1960). 
148. Humane Society v. New Jersey State Fish & Game Council, 129 N.J. 
Super. 239, 322 A.2d 841 (1974). The opinion is a good illustration of 
the current preoccupation with equal protection terminology, as 
applied to elections and office-holding, coupled with only cursory 
analysis of the abdication of political responsibility for public policy 
to agencies deliberately composed of special interest groups. This 
practice, very common in the states, is different from the political 
selection of full-time officials from members or on the recommenda-
tion of interest groups, from whom the appointee must then be 
formally independent, and distinct also from the due process problems 
common in professional licensing by boards appointed from the 
profession. 
To transfer the choice of policy goals from elected lawmakers to 
the representatives of favored interest groups raises questions of 
legitimacy even when the standards of delegation otherwise pass 
muster, but these questions are related to the familiar issue of stand-
ardless delegation. Whether the procedural safeguards mentioned by 
Professor K.C. Davis, such as administrative articulation of policy 
and opportunity for interested parties to argue for their views, can 
substitute for a discernible legislative policy may depend on whether 
one sees the delegated task as umpiring or compromising between in-
compatible and politically contested demands, or as applying expertise 
to the "rational" pursuit of a generally stipulated "public interest." 
Compare Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 
713 (1969), with Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 
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I have mentioned these issues, not to propose how to resolve 
them, but as examples of old and new questions that touch the 
legitimacy of the way we make laws, and that continue to concern 
us today. I hope the agenda is adequate to demonstrate that due 
process need not become an empty or trivial promise even if, as 
Justice Brandeis and some of his predecessors and at least one 
successor thought, there should be no "substantive due process" of 
any kind, even if due process asserts nothing about what laws 
would be made, but only how they would be made. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is not a new thought that "to guarantee the democratic 
legitimacy of political decisions by establishing essential rules for 
the political process" is the central function of judicial review, as 
Dean Rostow and Professor Strong, among others, have argued.149 
Indeed, the earliest opinions questioning the validity of laws did 
so by asserting either inherent limitations on the legislative func-
tion in a system of divided powers or other principles about institu-
tions and processes. The question we have been pursuing, however, 
is not the legitimacy of judicial review-whether it extends to the 
substance of enacted policies or whether it should do no more than 
safeguard the democratic process. Judicial review applies to either, 
depending on the constitutional premises. Our inquiry has con-
cerned what "due process" can sensibly mean as a constitutional 
standard for lawmaking, and not the proper scope and limits of 
judicial review. The legitimacy of enforcing constitutional con-
HARv. L. REV. 1183 (1973); Grundstein, Law and the Morality of Ad-
ministration, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 265 (1953) (review of the older 
debates of this classic issue) ; Merrill, Standards-A Safeguard for 
the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47 NEB. L. REV. 469 (1968); and 
Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972). For a striking illustra-
tion of changing policy toward the issue, see Florida v. Weinberger, 
492 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1974). 
Procedural safeguards can assure rationality and fairness in policy-
making, better indeed than can the legislative process itself, but they 
do not make up for shifting an unresolved political battle among 
competing social groups from a democratically elected legislature to 
an agency without some indication of which goals are deemed socially 
paramount. The practice of states (rarely of Congress) of placing the 
major opposing groups themselves on such a board to make policy for 
all citizens merely exacerbates the issue of institutional legitimacy. 
See Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1258-61 
(1966). The most recent, thorough reexamination of these issues is 
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. 
L. REV. 1669, 1760-70, 1790-1803 (1975). 
149. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 210 (1952); Strong, Toward an Acceptable Function of Judi-
cial Review?, 11 S. DAK. L. REV. 1 (1966). 
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straints on the substance of policy as well as those on process is not 
in dispute. 
What is in dispute, however, is the practice of reasoning back-
wards from a theory of judicial review to a theory of constitutional 
norms, the practice of judicial review premised on nothing more 
than a theory of judicial review itself. "Practical men," Holmes 
said in another context, generally "prefer to leave their major 
premises inarticulate, yet even for practical purposes theory gener-
ally turns out the most important thing in the end."150 We expect 
those who apply our constitutions to be practical men, but we do 
not long remain satisfied to leave their major premises inarticu-
late.151 Even for practical purposes, constitutional theory turns out 
to be the most important thing in the end, as we have had more 
than enough occasions to find out. The preference for deriving the 
meaning of the Constitution from the function of judicial review, 
from inarticulate premises or none at all, facilitates both lawless 
government and lawless judicial review in the literal, not the 
pejorative sense of that word. A court which sees its function as 
weighing social and personal interests in reviewing laws under the 
fifth or the fourteenth amendment will likely have the same view 
of its function under the first amendment,152 and the public as 
well as its governors will treat as legitimate anything that does 
not fail this test of judicial review. In this conventional, court-
centered view of constitutional law, due process was turned into 
the· most inarticulate of all premises for invalidating unreasonable 
laws. 
We have explored the contrary .theory that our constitutions 
state directives for government and for judicial review only as a 
consequence, a heresy occasionally held from Marshall's day 
through Holmes's to Black's. From that perspective, due process 
must carry a different meaning. Our governmental architecture, 
150. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 420 
(1899). 
151. The practical men who drafted President Truman's steel seizure order 
carefully left their major premises inarticulate, Exec. Order No. 
10,340, 3 C.F.R. 65 (Supp. 1952), and allowed the practical men on the 
bench to select the basis of legitimation, bringing about an historic 
decision on due process in lawmaking. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
152. Consider also the contract clause. The contrast of approach between 
Black's rejection of "substantive due process" and Frankfurter's and 
Hand's unwillingness to enforce the first amendment lies in the point 
that if the Constitution required laws to be reasonable, Black would 
accept the obligation to enforce the requirement, whether he thought 
it desirable or not. See El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (1965) 
(Black, J., dissenting on the contract clause issue). 
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in Holmes's metaphor, includes no directive to its occupants to make 
only laws that rationally serve social ends, and we do not compli-
ment the political sense of the architects to attribute such an unus-
able directive to them. Despite the current interest in ways to 
bring the goals of law, even unpragmatic, non-purposive values, 
within the reach of economic and similar models of rational 
analysis,153 there is no more basis to claim that the Constitution 
imposed such a view of policy-making on legislatures than that it 
imposed Benthamite utilitarianism, Pareto optimal.ism, or Herbert 
Spencer's Social Statics.154 
What we do have is a blueprint for the due process of delibera-
tive, democratically accountable government, with fifty statewide 
and numberless local variations. The design does not presuppose 
philosopher kings elected by philosopher constitutents, free from 
ignorance, sloth, gluttony, avarice, short-sightedness, political cow-
ardice and ambition; quite the contrary. It undertakes to confine 
political irrationality by process, not what Learned Hand called 
"moral adjurations." Our institutions and procedures are de-
signed to curb power to make law capriciously, on merely personal 
or inarticulate impulse, without preventing the enactment of meas-
ures that can win deliberate assent, even though they cater to a 
selfish minority, even if they are doubtful means toward divergent 
goals. These processes postulate, as Learned Hand once described 
Holmes' view of legislation, that "a law which can get itself en-
acted is almost sure to have behind it a support which is not 
wholly unreasonable,"155 but more than that: they postulate that 
the support itself is the crux, that the means and ends of policy 
remain our own responsibility, as long as constitutional boundaries 
are observed.. !!'or nothing I have said suggests that fue power of 
political majorities is beyond constitutional bounds if only it is 
exercised. by the prescribed process, or that the bounds should 
not be enforced. As long as we have rights that can be fairly attri-
buted to a constitution, whether they are as mundane as limits on 
public spending or as precious as liberty of conscience and life 
itself, at least that process requires amendment of the consti-
153. See, e.g., R. PosNER, ECONOMIC .ANALYSIS OF LAw (1973); and the 
witty commentary by Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism 
About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974). 
154. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double 
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 285 (1973). 
Leff, supra note 153, at 475-77, capsulizes some of the reasons that, if 
translated into a legislative setting, would make such a test, for legisla-
tion impossible. . 
155. L. HAND, supra note 99, at 8 (1952). See also his essay on Chief 
Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function. Id. at 201. 
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tution itself.156 But the crucial privileges and immunities that 
most occupy us in constitutional law gain nothing in clarity or 
in security by being attributed to the words in the fifth and the 
:fourteenth amendments that promise us due process of law. In-
stead, the misdirection of due process ;to the substance of enact-
ments diverts it from testing the process of enactment itself. 
For this very reason the theory of due process we have explored 
is likely to remain a heresy. As a charter of government a consti-
tution must prescribe legitimate processes, not legitimate outcomes, 
if like ours (and unlike more ideological documents elsewhere) it 
is to serve many generations through changing times. But as a 
source of judicial review, a constitution will be called upon to judge 
the legitimacy of outcomes, of the concrete precipitates of the 
process. To judge legislation as a process, not as a product, not 
only drives courts toward the problems of standards and of sanc-
tions that we have touched on, it also requires them to deny valid-
ity to some excellent enactments while sustaining deplorable ones 
that have been faultlessly made. 
This tension between a general rule and its concrete application 
is unavoidable in judicial review, as in all adjudication.157 Still, 
it has not dissuaded courts from enforcing due procedure in 
administrative and local government law. So perhaps the time will 
come once again for one of our recurrent returns to constitutional 
theory, and not only from sympathy for one of its most abused 
156. State constitutions often include constraints against the urge of 
politicians to spend taxes not yet levied, so that such debts can be 
incurred only by constitutional amendment. The sixteenth amend-
ment can be seen as removing a right of taxpayers previously pro-
tected by constitutional law, rightly or not, and was of course so 
regarded by them. The Supreme Court's decisions on religion have 
called forth efforts to amend the first amendment, so far unsuc-
cessfully. But the California Supreme Court's conclusion that the 
death penalty was a constitutionally forbidden punishment, People 
v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972), was 
overturned by constitutional amendment on initiative petition. See 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27; People v. Murphy, 8 Cal. 3d 349, 503 P.2d 
594, 105 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1972). 
157. Apart from resistance against enforcing required procedures in favor 
of guilty defendants, this ingrained perspective of adjudication has 
long kept the first amendment from being read as a prohibition against 
making certain laws, which it is, ahead of any question of the rights of 
particular persons in a concrete case. See Linde, "Clear and Present 
Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 
STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1174-86 (1970). Cf. Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 
U.S. 130, 136 (1974) (dissenting opinion) which complains that the 
majority relegated the facts of defendants' conduct to footnotes. This 
is an entirely correct practice when the validity of the law itself is 
at issu~. 
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premises.158 For the last few years have reawakened our apprecia-
tion of the primacy of process over product in a free society, the 
knowledge that no ends can be better than the means of their 
achievement. "The highest morality is almost always the morality 
of process," Professor Bickel wrote about Watergate a few months 
before his untimely death.159 If this republic is remembered in 
the distant history of law, it is likely to be for its enduring adher-
ence to legitimate institutions and processes, not for its perfection 
of unique principles of justice and certainly not for the rationality 
of its laws. This recognition now may well take our attention 
beyond the processes of adjudication and of executive government 
to a new concern with the due process of lawmaking. 
158. It is doubtful from where the impetus for a reexamination of the re-
cent return to substantive review will come. Forty years ago sub-
stantive due process stood in the way of state and federal social 
legislation that was considered desirable and justified by solid political 
majorities. Possibly second thoughts about the new formulas of sub-
stantive review will follow, not from the frustration and protests of 
legislatures, but from the predictable overenthusiastic use of these 
open-ended formulas by lower courts. 
159. Bickel, Watergate and the Legal Order, 57 COMMENTARY, Jan., 1974, 
at25. 
